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China is one of the most popular investment destinations in the world. This paper argues that FDI
inflows into China are in fact driven by some fundamental inefficiencies in the Chinese
economy. Specifically, one of the inefficiencies has to do with a high level of fragmentation of
both goods and asset markets. This fragmentation increases demand for FDI both because market
fragmentation makes indigenous Chinese firms uncompetitive and because market fragmentation
creates more investment opportunities for the mobile foreign capital. This paper is a chapter from
a larger book-length research project, tentatively entitled, Selling China: The Institutional
Foundation of Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era.
Keywords: FDI, capital market, transitional economies.2
Summary of the book, Selling China: The Institutional
Foundation of Foreign Direct Investment During the Reform Era
China is one of the most popular investment destinations in the world. Throughout much
of the 1990s, China accounted for 50 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) going into
developing countries and in recent years, China has been the second largest recipient of FDI in
the world, after the United States. The recent agreements between China on the one hand and the
United States and the European Union on the other hand over China’s accession into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) may increase China’s already impressive FDI inflows significantly.
According to a forecast by Goldman Sachs, in three to four years, China’s WTO membership
could boost FDI to 100 billion dollars a year, from the current 40.4 billion dollars.
Chinese officials and foreign business practitioners hail China’s large FDI inflows as one
of the most celebrated achievements of the reform era. Institutions such as the World Bank have
credited FDI as a main driving force behind China’s economic success. International rating
agencies routinely use FDI flows as an important macroeconomic indicator to assess China’s
creditworthiness. Standard & Poor’s, for example, in its most recent report on China’s credit
rating, cited “strong inflows of foreign direct investments” as one of the factors to justify an
upgrade of China’s credit ratings. Academic researchers are equally enthusiastic about FDI flows
into China. They tout the enormous benefits of FDI for China, such as technology transfer, the
introduction of marketing know-how, capital infusion, etc.
This book sets out to debunk much of the conventional wisdom on China’s huge FDI
inflows. The central claim of the book is that the large absorption of FDI by China is not a sign
of the strengths of its economy but of its fundamental weaknesses. Three lines of argument are
advanced to support this claim. First, much of the export-oriented FDI—mainly originating from
ethnic Chinese firms in Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan—materializes because of the severe
liquidity constraints on the part of export-oriented indigenous Chinese firms. These liquidity
constraints arise not because export-oriented Chinese firms are inefficient but because they are
private and for years Chinese banks were explicitly prohibited from lending to private firms.
Private firms have no choice but to raise financing in the only way they can—selling their claims
on future cash flows to foreign firms. FDI rises as a result.
Second, much of the FDI oriented toward the domestic market—mainly in capital-
intensive industries—does not finance the creation of new capacity but finances the acquisition
of existing assets, mainly from state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs have accumulated massive3
financial losses and huge liabilities on their balance sheets. The insolvency of SOEs is a familiar
story. What is not familiar is the fact that SOEs have built up a potentially valuable asset base
during the reform era, which was financed by a generous infusion of subsidized credit from the
banking system. On top of a good asset base, SOEs have generated poor or negative returns,
which renders them potential acquisition targets. Because the Chinese government still refuses to
adopt a privatization policy to deal with the SOE insolvency situation, the only viable acquirers
end up being foreign firms. FDI rises on this account. Third, China’s capital and product markets
are severely fragmented, which means that a Chinese firm located in Province A cannot invest in
Province B. The economic fragmentation gives an enormous advantage to foreign firms, which
are not faced by similar capital constraints. FDI rises on this account because foreign firms can
choose more projects to invest in than domestic firms. In brief, FDI inflows rise in response to
either market growth opportunities or to labor-cost saving opportunities only because indigenous
firms are uncompetitive across-the-board and are unable to respond to the same set of
opportunities.
A number of aspects of the research set this project apart from others. One is that an
explicit theoretical framework guides much of the empirical research. The book offers what is
termed as an “institutional foundation” perspective on FDI. The institutional foundation
argument both builds upon and departs from the dominant theoretical approach in the studies of
FDI, which is known as the industrial organization theory of FDI. The commonality is a
microeconomic reasoning that FDI, as an ownership arrangement, is designed to overcome
certain problems inherent in arms-length contractual transactions. The departure has to do with
what constitutes the sources of problems besetting contractual transactions. While the industrial
organization theory focuses on market failures involved in transactions of certain resources
endowed with unique characteristics (such as indivisibility or asset-specificity), the institutional
foundation argument focuses on the failures resulting from imperfectly-designed financial and
economic institutions in allocating all goods and resources. Furthermore, these failures are not a
result of characteristics of goods or resources being transacted but as a result of deliberate policy
and political choices of the government.
The second departure directly follows from the first. While much of the works on FDI
studies the motivations and capabilities of foreign investing firms, this study tries to understand
the motivations, constraints and capabilities of the Chinese host firms and local governments.
The empirical emphasis is based on a conceptualization of FDI that views FDI as a function of
relative, rather than as absolute, competitiveness of foreign firms. Relative foreign4
competitiveness is, in turn, a function of foreign competitiveness and domestic
uncompetitiveness. As such, studying domestic uncompetitiveness should be just as analytically
rewarding as studying foreign competitiveness. This way of researching FDI has been
surprisingly rare among existing studies.
Although the overall objective is to explain FDI patterns in China, the analytical
framework of the book revolves around the design and operations of key economic and financial
institutions in China in affecting China’s FDI patterns. As such, the book offers a broad re-
interpretation not only of FDI in China but also of the Chinese economic reforms. This latter
aspect of the book should interest those readers who are interested in China’s reform process and
in the lessons one can draw from the Chinese reforms relevant to other reforming socialist
economies. In recent years, the Chinese gradualist reform strategy has been held up as a model
for countries trying to transform themselves into market economies. This book questions this
perspective. It shows that the partial reforms, while successful in increasing the scope of market,
have so far failed to address the fundamental inefficiencies in the Chinese economy and one
reason why China has averted an economic meltdown is because of the large infusions of FDI
rather than because of the success of China’s reform strategy.
In this working paper, I only focus on one of the institutional pillars underlying much of
the FDI developments in the 1990s. This paper first describes the fragmentation of the Chinese
economy. Economic fragmentation has a strong bearing on Chinese FDI demand. It reduces the
set of investment opportunities available to Chinese firms, while increasing the set of investment
opportunities available to foreign firms. FDI rises because foreign firms are more successful than
Chinese firms in capturing these investment opportunities. The paper presents both quantitative
and case-study evidence to document this phenomenon. (This paper appears as Chapter 4 in the
book.)5
 Economic fragmentation and FDI
MNCs are not only multinational; they are, first and foremost, multi-regional in China.
Motorola, Schindler, Otis, Volkswagen, Ford, Nabisco, etc. have all established operations
across the country and increasingly Western MNCs are creating a holding company structure to
coordinate their complex activities and interactions among their subsidiaries or affiliates and to
economize on the shared overhead costs. These cross-regional investments or acquisitions are not
limited to the Fortune 500 corporations; in fact much smaller MNCs have actively acquired
assets throughout the country. A prominent example is the Hong Kong based China Strategic
Investment Ltd. China Strategic Investment, with sale revenue of only 84 million dollars in 1992,
acquired 200 companies throughout China during a span of two years between 1992 and 1994. Its
joint ventures are located in more than nine provinces and its China Tires Holdings, via its
acquisitions of tire plants in five provinces, emerged to be the largest tire producer in China in
1994.
1 CSI was poised to become one of the largest industrial conglomerates in China until the
central government intervened to put a brake on its acquisition bids in 1995.
Our question, as always, is, “Why can’t Chinese companies do the same?” We already
provided one answer in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3: Because the government has refused to allow
SOEs to be privatized, Chinese non-state firms cannot acquire loss-making SOEs while MNCs
can via what I call a “JV acquisition” mechanism.
2 But clearly this is not the whole answer
because Chinese SOEs do not acquire other SOEs either. SOE acquisition by other SOEs clearly
does not entail any ideological complications and yet this type of acquisitions has been rare,
especially acquisitions involving firms from different jurisdictions. The paucity of acquisitions is
even more puzzling considering the following two facts. First, Chinese firms and government
agencies have been investing massively to build new plants and facilities. Between 1991 and
1998, for three out of those eight years, investment/GDP ratio exceeded 40 percent and for six
out of these eight years, the investment/GDP ratio exceeded 38 percent. Reform era is sometimes
touted as heralding a shift from heavy to light industry. In fact, this never happened. As a
                                                     
1 See (Lim 1994).
2 All of the acquisitions by CSI were JV acquisitions, i.e., CSI contributed cash while the target
firms contributed themselves as equity stakes in the newly formed FIEs. The regional governments then
owned these FIEs proportionate to the valuation of these contributed firms themselves.6
comparison, between 1978 and 1985, for seven out of eight years, investment/GDP ratio was
lower than 38 percent.
3
Second, during much of the 1990s, Chinese economy has suffered from a chronic
overcapacity, especially in its manufacturing industries. According to a Chinese researcher who
analyzed the data from Third Industry Census in 1995, of ninety-four industrial products, thirty-
five products, or 36 percent, had a capacity utilization rate at or below 50 percent.
4 Automotive
industry, the focus of analysis in this chapter, has one of the most severe overcapacity problems.
In truck production, in 1995, capacity utilization rate was 36 percent; bus production, 29.8
percent, and passenger cars, 64.9 percent.
5 The insatiable investment appetite and a massive
buildup of excess capacity are sure a strange combination. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, MNCs
in the 1990s resorted to mainly asset acquisitions—whether direct or via JV—as an entry
strategy. They were doing exactly the right thing considering the extent of excess capacity in the
Chinese economy. What is puzzling is why Chinese firms have favored building facilities from
scratch when asset acquisitions might have been a cheaper option. This gets to the third pillar of
our institutional foundation argument—economic and asset fragmentation in the Chinese
economy.
At purchasing power parity (PPP), Chinese GNP in 1998 was estimated to be 3.98
trillion dollars, which makes China the second largest economy in the world, after the United
States (7.92 trillion dollars) and before Japan (2.93 trillion dollars). Dividing 3.98 trillion dollars
by 31—the number of Chinese provinces. One gets 128 billion dollars. That is about the size of
the Danish economy (at 126 billion dollars in PPP terms in 1998).
6 The point of this exercise is
to show that there is a big difference between a market that is integrated and one that is
fragmented. For any MNC contemplating an investment in China, it is not negotiating with a
government or a firm representing the second largest economy in the world but with one that
represents only a fraction of it. Chinese economy is remarkably fragmented and has become more
                                                     
3 The investment/GDP ratio data are contained in (State Statistical Bureau 1999).
4 See (Zhao 1997).
5 Data are from (Office of Third Industrial Census 1997).
6 The GNP figures in purchasing power parity terms are from Table 1, (World Bank 2000). It is
important to note that different PPP estimates exist. For example, the widely-cited Penn World Table
estimates Chinese GNP at xxx in its PPP calculation. PPP calculations vary across different estimates
because they are based on different assumptions about what are relevant price levels.7
fragmented over time. One needs to recognize this fact in order to understand the distribution of
bargaining power between an MNC and the Chinese entity it is negotiating with.
Let me begin by noting a number of curious economic facts: While during the reform era
Chinese have begun to trade actively with outside world and enthusiastically court foreign
investments, Chinese have increasingly traded less with each other and invested less outside their
home provinces. The tiny Macao, in 1994, held an investment position in China that amounted to
several multiples of what Guangdong province invested outside Guangdong. That China has a
fragmented economic structure is not news to students of Chinese economy; what may be new is
the remarkable extent of its economic fragmentation juxtaposed on top of rapidly increasing
economic and investment ties to the outside world. In 1985, external trade/GDP ratio rose from
25 percent to 40 percent; during the same period, internal trade/retail sale ratio declined from 60
percent to 50 percent.
7 Cross-regional investments, as I will show later in this chapter, also
declined during the reform era while inward FDI climbed up rapidly.
The main claim of this chapter is that there is a connection between these two
developments. Economic fragmentation has made FDI more valuable to the Chinese than
otherwise would be the case. The simplest illustration of this logic comes from the world of
sports. In the United States, the National Football League (NFL) deliberately restricts the number
of football teams to a fewer number than the cities that desire to have them. As a result, cities
compete fiercely with each other to lure a team to them. They offer huge financial subsidies to
build stadiums and they top each other’s offer aggressively. The result is that the teams and their
owners are richly rewarded and exercise an enormous bargaining power over their host cities.
8
Economic fragmentation does to Chinese firms what National Football League does to
the American cities desiring to have a home team of their own—by reducing their bargaining
power vis-à-vis investing foreign firms. Economic fragmentation is complemented and reinforced
by asset fragmentation. Assets are owned by disparate political rather than economic units. The
first and foremost manifestation of the political control is that a vast majority of SOEs are under
the direct controls of regional governments. “Control” here means broadly de facto ownership
rights—the rights to make crucial decisions, to receive residual cash flows and to dispose of
assets. In 1995, there were 87,905 industrial SOEs, of which 83,167 were owned by the regional
                                                     
7 See (World Bank 1994, p. 3).
8 This example as well as the reasoning about bargaining power come from (Brandenburger and
Nalebuff 1997).8
governments. The locally-owned SOEs accounted for 65 percent of the total SOE assets and 64
percent of sales.
9 The ownership functions of the regional governments are supplemented by the
broad regulatory power in their hands. Despite central policy prohibitions, it is widely known
that local governments set up trade barriers against inter-regional trade as well as to curtail
capital exports. But foreign firms are not constrained by the capital controls imposed by the
regional governments and are relatively free to invest where an investment opportunity presents
itself. This dynamic allows a firm such as CSI to acquire assets in China on an unprecedented
scale.
The chapter begins by providing a detailed account of the phenomenon of economic
fragmentation. This is followed by studying a classic case of economic fragmentation—China’s
automotive industry, an industry which, by its economic logic, is extremely concentrated
everywhere else in the world, except in China. The last section presents hypotheses and evidence
connecting economic fragmentation with FDI demand.
Economic fragmentation
Chinese economy has been variously described as a “cellular” economy,
10 federalism,
Chinese style,
11 or de facto federalism.
12 However it is phrased, the basic idea is that China has a
decentralized economic structure and under this system each region is quite operationally and
financially autonomous, as if it were a profit center in a firm. It ought be stressed that this system
departed sharply from the traditional Soviet model not only in a number of specific planning
practices but rather fundamentally in the operational principle that governed the two economic
organizations. The Soviet system organized its economic activities on a sectoral basis, i.e., one
government agency, usually a ministry, governed most activities in one sector across different
geographic boundaries. This is known as the vertical management principle in Chinese economic
literature (or the "branch management" principle in Soviet economic literature). The Chinese
system was and, to a large extent, still is based upon territorial or regional planning, i.e., one
government agency--the local government--governs most economic activities in one geographic
                                                     
9 The data are from the 1995 industrial census. See (Office of Third Industrial Census 1997).
10 (Donnithorne 1981 ).
11 [Montinola, Forthcoming #1255].
12 (Huang 1996).9
region across different economic sectors. This is known as the horizontal management
principle.
13
One country, thirty-one markets
As an administrative entity, China is divided into thirty-one provinces.
14 Each province
in turn consists of prefectures, cities, counties, and townships. As of 1998, altogether there were
331 prefectures, 2,126 counties and 26,400 townships. Because Chinese political system is
unitary in nature, a strict hierarchy prevails. Provincial governments appoint heads of prefectures
or cities, who, in turn, appoint magistrates of counties and townships. By any standard, this is a
massive and highly centralized political apparatus.
In contrast to the political centralization, Chinese economy comprises of many
independent and poorly-integrated segments. Market segmentation means that goods, services
and factors of production—capital and labor—are not easily mobile across different regions. The
immobility of goods and capital is typically gauged by variations in prices of goods and in
returns on capital across different regions. Here indicators are many and are consistent among
themselves in pointing to the same direction. The World Bank, in probably the most
comprehensive study of this issue to date, presented data for the early 1990s showing large
variations in prices across provinces. For example, the “all China” price of steel in 1991 was
1,984 yuan, with a minimum price of 1,857 yuan (Hebei) and a maximum of 2,435 yuan
(Chongqing city). More systematic evidence shows the same trend. Between 1986 and 1991, for
seven broad categories of consumer goods, regional variations in prices increased, although for
some of the products, there was some reduction in price variations during this period. Another
evidence—returns on capital—points to the same direction. Although there has been some
reduction in variations in profit rates across different industrial sectors, variations in returns on
capital across Chinese provinces increased between 1985 and 1991. After controlling for
                                                     
13 See (Huang 1994  ) for more details of this argument. The choice of one organizing principle over
another is beyond the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that the choice was in part accidental and in part
due to the structural conditions faced by the leaders of each country. One such structural difference was the
role of ethnic nationalities in each of the countries. Economic centralization in the former Soviet Union was
used to contain ethnic nationalism whereas in China such concerns were much weaker.
14 The provinces also include four provincial-level municipalities, Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and
Chongqing. In the 1970s, there were twenty-nine provinces. In 1987, Hainan, formerly under Guangdong
province, was elevated to a provincial status and in 1998, Chongqing, located in Sichuan province, became
a municipality with the provincial status.10
differences in tax rates, the average coefficient of variation value for twenty provinces was 0.193
in 1986 but 0.657 in 1990. Based on this evidence, the World Bank draws the following
conclusion, “The overall finding is that there is no evidence to support a convergence of returns
to capital across different provinces. Other things being equal, this suggests that capital mobility
has not increased noticeably since 1985.”
15  There is direct and strong evidence on declining
inter-provincial trade. For example, the percentage of total consumer imports originating from
other provinces declined from 38 percent in 1979 to 29 percent in 1986. In some provinces, this
reduction has been quite drastic. Inner Mongolia imported 100 percent of its consumer goods in
1979, but only 22 percent in 1986.
16
Capital market is similarly fragmented and getting more so over time. Two researchers,
Shaoguang Wang and Angang Hu, showed that net exports as ratios of provincial GDP declined
uniformly across all Chinese provinces in the 1980s and 1990s.
17 Net exports are the differences
between savings and investments in a province. When a province saves more than it invests, its
net exports are positive, i.e., it is exporting capital to other provinces (or to the central
government). When a province invests more than it saves, it is importing capital in order to
finance the portion of its capital requirements it cannot fund on itself own. What the two
researchers showed is that provinces with a large positive net export position in the late 1970s
(such as Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai) ended up with a significantly smaller positive net export
position in the early 1990s. On the other hand, provinces which received large capital from other
provinces in the late 1970s received far less in the early 1990s. Although this measure is
imprecise, it can serve as a rough indicator of the extent of the barriers to inter-provincial capital
mobility.
18
                                                     
15 (World Bank 1994, p. 54).
16 (World Bank 1990).
17 (Wang and Hu 1999).
18 The imprecision arises from two main sources. First, Wang and Hu did not net out the portion of
capital export to the central government. This weakens their claim that there was substantial inter-provincial
capital movement before the reform. There might be substantial movement of capital across provinces
before the reform but it was effected by central planning. Second, Wang and Hu did not net out foreign
investment in their data. The problem here is that since many of the rich and coastal provinces began to
receive FDI in the early 1990s their net export can decline not because they export less capital to other
provinces but because they receive more FDI. Import of FDI is a negatively-signed debit item in the GDP
accounting framework and mathematically it would reduce the size of the positive net exports. This11
That China’s marketplace is fragmented or that it has become more fragmented over time
is not a new revelation to students of Chinese economy; what may be less familiar is the striking
extent of fragmentation of the Chinese economy. There are a number of ways to show how
fragmented Chinese economy is. First, as I have already alluded to, China’s political system is
remarkably centralized and unified compared to many of the political systems presiding over
large countries. Political unification is often thought of as facilitating economic unification as
trades in goods, services and assets are transacted under common or at least similar regulatory
and legal frameworks and standards. Political integration is also supposed to reduce transaction
costs of trade by creating a common currency area and allowing freedom to travel across
different regions. It is thus unusual for a country to have such a high degree of political
centralization coupled with a remarkable degree of market segmentation. The aforementioned
World Bank report makes the following comment, “In China today, there is an anomalous
situation where major elements of economic union including a single currency and a common
external tariff are combined with a lack of some basic features of a free trade area.”
19
Second, China’s market fragmentation is remarkable considering the extent Chinese
economy is integrated to the rest of the world. For some reason, Chinese have increasingly
preferred to trade with foreigners to trading among themselves. In 1992, the average domestic
trade/GDP ratio for twenty-six provinces for which data are available was 14.7 percent, but in the
same year, the average foreign trade/GDP ratio was 17.5 percent. This foreign bias is new and it
did not result from historical patterns. In 1985, the average provincial domestic trade/GDP ratio
was 25.1 percent, compared to 14.2 percent for the foreign trade/GDP ratio. Between 1985 and
1992, of twenty-five provinces whose data are available in the World Bank report, twenty-two of
them experienced a decline in domestic trade/GDP ratio; some, dramatically. Tianjin, for
example, started with a domestic trade/GDP ratio of 90.2 percent in 1985 but ended with 14.2
percent in 1992, a decline of 76 percent. Heilongjiang, Shanghai, Anhui, Fujian, Henan,
Guangdong, Guangxi, Gansu, and Ningxia all experienced a double-digit reduction in the
domestic trade/GDP ratio. In contrast, of the twenty-seven provinces for which there are
available data, foreign trade/GDP ratio rose in twenty-six of them. The sole exception was Hebei
province, whose ratio declined by 1.4 percent.
                                                                                                                                                             
statistical bias is especially severe because provinces that would normally export capital to other provinces
receive most of the FDI.
19 (World Bank 1994, p. 7).12
Thus over time, Chinese provinces increasingly trade less with each other while at the
same time increasing their economic integration to the outside world at a rapid pace. The
declining inter-provincial trade, coupled with a growing external trade orientation, suggests that
Chinese market may be less unified as compared to similarly-sized markets elsewhere. For
example, trade among members of European Community (EC) amounted to 28.3 percent of EC’s
GDP in 1989. This is higher than the ratio for the average inter-provincial trade to GDP ratio in
China (14.7 percent) in 1992. In 1990, trade among the republics of the former Soviet Union was
27.2 percent of GDP, excluding the largely self-sufficient Russian republic. When the data for
the Russian republic are included, the Soviet inter-republican trade to GDP ratio was still higher,
at 17.3 percent.
20
To appreciate the anomaly of the Chinese situation, it is noteworthy that the normal
trading patterns exhibit precisely the opposite kind of bias. Trade, as economists have
documented, is a home-bound activity, i.e., domestic residents tend to buy from each other more
than they do from foreigners. A convincing illustration of the natural home bias in trade is a
comparison of domestic trade among Canadian provinces with trade volume between Canada and
the United States. This is a good test of the home bias in trade because Canada and the United
States share many characteristics and the kind of differences that normally deter trade along
cultural and political lines should not be noticeably pronounced between these two countries as
among Canadian provinces. Yet Canadians trade with each other far more than they do with their
American neighbor. As of 1988, inter-provincial trade in Canada, for example, was about 20
times its trade with the 30 states in the United States—the states Canadian provinces traded with
most intensively.
21
Third, China is widely perceived as a controlled and closed economy. (Sachs and Warner
1995) classified China as a “closed economy”, using their three criteria all focusing on external
policy measures (tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and black-market premium for foreign
exchange as an indication of distortions of foreign exchange allocation). Foreign investors also
frequently complain about bureaucratic and legal barriers and difficulties of doing business in
China. However, this widely-shared perception of China as a closed economy is simply
incongruous with many facts of the Chinese economy. For one thing, as I have pointed out in
Chapter 1, FDI/capital formation ratio for China was already inordinately high as compared to
                                                     
20 All these data are found in (World Bank 1994), pp. 37-43.
21 The finding was reported in (McCallum 1995), as quoted in (Ghemawat 2000).13
many countries that are on the “open economy” list as devised by Sachs and Warner. Another
anomaly is that investors from foreign countries seem to have found China a much more
hospitable place than investors from “foreign provinces.” As I have documented in Chapter 1,
foreign investment, as measured by shares of capital formation, is often several multiples of
similarly-measured other provincial investments for some provinces (such as Guangdong,
Liaoning and Beijing) or is roughly equal in size for other provinces (such as Shaanxi and
Sichuan). Only in Shanghai, does one find investment from other provinces significantly exceed
foreign investment.
22
Regional import substitution strategies
Economic fragmentation is not just a function of geography but also of policy and
institutional choices. Arguably, the policy factors have been more important in creating the kind
of internal trade patterns that have been presented so far than the natural factors such as
geography. China is a large country and its mountainous and treacherous expanse imposes high
transport costs on trade among Chinese regions. Geographic distance, as demonstrated in the so-
called “gravity” models of trade, affects patterns of trade. But in the case of China, something
more than geographic distance is at play. While high transport costs may induce an initially low
level of internal trade, they do not explain why internal trade has declined over time and why it
has declined during a period in which massive investments were made in China’s transport
infrastructure.
23 A more important driver of economic fragmentation results from what I term as
“regional import substitution strategies,” which have sharply reduced cross-regional mobility of
capital and goods. Regional import substitution strategies, just as import substitution strategies at
                                                     
22 See Table 2.6, (World Bank 1994). Two caveats are in order for Shanghai data. One is that
central government invested heavily in Shanghai during the period for which data are available (i.e., late
1980s and early 1990s). Thus it is possible that investments from other provinces in fact incorporated
centrally-organized investment programs. Second, because the data series end in 1992, it is possible that the
magnitude of foreign investment is under-estimated. Shanghai began to receive a large flow of FDI
beginning in 1992.
23 During the 1980s and 1990s, China has made major strides in its infrastructural developments.
The railways increased from 40,990 kilometers in 1980 to 56,700 kilometers in 1998. The bigger increases
occurred in roads and airline travel routes. Roads increased from 88,000 kilometers in 1980 to 127,850
kilometers. Civil aviation routes registered the greatest increases, from 19,530 kilometers to 150,580
kilometers.  See (State Statistical Bureau 1999).14
the national level, aim to develop import-replacing infant industries at home by relying upon a
combination of trade restrictions and of imposing restrictions on capital export. Over time, a
fragmented and undersized industrial structure emerged as the economic reforms have placed
more regulatory responsibilities, ownership of firms, policy and financial resources in the hands
of regional governments.
There are many anecdotal accounts of active anti-trade policies adopted by regional
governments which are consistent with the aforementioned data showing declining internal trade
over time. What is remarkable is that these trade restraints against goods from other parts of the
same country are quite similar to trade protectionist policies adopted by politically sovereign
nations and indeed, in some of the areas, the trade restraining policies have even gone beyond
trade protectionism at the national level. According to a detailed study on this topic by
(Wedeman 2000), provincial governments resorted to alright import bans, enforcing
discriminatory product and health certification standards, imposition of tariffs--in the form of
fines for importing goods from foreign provinces--and dumping charges, confiscation of profits
earned on marketing foreign-provincial goods, subsidies to local commercial units for buying
locally-produced products, etc. A number of counties in Hubei province went a step further:
They issued their own currencies in order to prevent their residents from purchasing goods in the
neighboring Hunan province. 
24
Regional governments curtailed both imports from and exports to foreign provinces,
although the emphasis on import and export curtailment would vary depending on the economic
cycles. During an expansionary phase of a business cycle when supply became taut, local
governments attempted to reduce outflows of natural resources and raw materials to other
regions. In the 1980s, there were several rounds of inter-provincial trade conflicts involving
export of raw materials and natural resources. In the annals of Chinese economic history, these
episodes are known as cotton wars, silkworm cocoon wars and tobacco wars.
25 Import controls
were imposed on manufactured goods and were more frequent when the market experienced a
glut, as during much of the 1990s. Local governments resorted to a beggar-thy-neighbor tactic to
deal with a recession by curtailing competition with home-province products and by protecting
local markets. China experienced a particularly strong bout of import protectionism during the
austerity period of 1989-1991 as regional governments, laboring under a recessionary effect of
                                                     
24 (Wedeman 2000), p. 227.
25 See (Watson 1989  ) and (Guo Wanqing 1992).15
monetary tightening, resorted to various and extreme measures to protect local markets. In recent
years, trade protectionism eased somewhat. Since 1995, Chinese economy has turned from a
shortage economy into one characterized by overcapacity and a buyer’s market. In addition, the
central government also liberalized a considerable number of prices of raw materials and energy.
The reduction of the previously huge mark-ups has dampened the impetus for developing
manufacturing capabilities locally. This has apparently boosted interregional trade, although the
economic evidence on this effect is not overwhelming.
The most immediate effect of regional import substitution strategies is emergence of an
economic structure that is “repetitive and duplicative.” Regions do not specialize along the lines
of their comparative advantage. Instead they all push strongly into similar industries and product
groups, resulting in a convergence of industrial production across different regions. The
convergence of production is sharpest in manufacturing industries. (Young 1997) presents
evidence that while shares of manufacturing and construction industries in provincial output
varied between 34 percent and 77 percent in 1978, by 1995, the range of variations was reduced
to between 36 percent and 57 percent. (World Bank 1994), looking at eight principal groups of
industries (coal mining, tobacco, textiles, chemicals, building materials, machinery, and
electronics and telecommunication), found that their representation in all the provinces. Also
variations of number of firms and total employment are also low, considering the diversity of the
provinces in terms of their size and endowment of natural resources. To put Chinese industrial
convergence in perspective, as of the early 1990s, there were seventy-six firms producing TVs
with 113 assembly lines scattered around the country and as of mid-1990s, there were over 120
vehicle assembly firms in every province except two remote provinces (Tibet and Qinghuai),
exceeding the total number of motor vehicle producers in the world. This industrial dispersion
violates the usual economic logic that predicts firms to be typically clustered together regionally
in order to reap the benefits of agglomeration economies.
The convergence of industrial production results directly from forward and backward
integration activities engaged in by the regional governments. The integration incentive lies in
the arbitrary pricing decisions made by China’s central planners. Historically, central planners
have priced raw materials and upstream goods low while keeping prices of final goods high,
creating huge profit margins in the final goods sector.
26 According to the World Bank, as of the
                                                     
26 The reason for such a pricing decision is unclear. (Wong 1992  ) argues that the price wedge is
designed so that central planners can extract surpluses to finance industry. This is a strange motive, as16
1980s, the price of heavy fuel oil is one-third that of the international level and coal is set at 60
percent of its long-run marginal production costs (World Bank 1985: 71). As regional
governments have gained more policy and financial resources, they are more able to pursue
activities to capture the rent inherent in the large price distortions. Provinces with comparative
advantages in natural resources and raw materials integrated forward to set up manufacturing
operations in order to capture the rents created by the price mark-ups (called price scissors in the
central planning parlance). Provinces with comparative advantages in downstream stages of
production respond by integrating upward. Between 1979 and 1984, Yunnan and Hunan, two
tobacco-producing provinces, rose by 3 percentage points in terms of their national shares of
cigarette production, while two traditional cigarette-making provinces, Shanghai and Shandong,
declined by 3 and 2.4 percentage points, respectively.
27 In the case of natural resources,
provinces resort to importing the needed inputs abroad. In the 1980s, Zhejiang and Jiangsu,
China’s traditional suppliers of raw silk located next door to Shanghai, kept raw silk to
themselves rather than “exporting” to Shanghai. In 1988, Shanghai received 40 tons out of 2,000
tons of raw silk allocated to it and Shanghai had to use its precious foreign exchange to procure
raw silk abroad despite the fact that China was the world’s largest producer and exporter of raw
silk.
28
Institutional sources of economic fragmentation
Even if price distortions create rental opportunities, they do not necessarily lead to the
enactment of regional import substitution strategies documented above. Regional governments
must be sure that the benefits of pursuing regional import substitution accrue to them, not to the
central government. How rental income is divided between the central government and regional
governments is a function of an institutional design. Under China’s current institutional
                                                                                                                                                             
(Young 1997) pointed out. Since everything is arbitrary under central planning, the planners could just have
set raw materials’ prices high and final goods’ prices low to accomplish the same goal. The more plausible
reason is ideological. According to Marxist theory of value, raw materials do not acquire value until and
unless they have been processed by labor inputs. Final goods would then have fetched higher prices than
otherwise would be the case to compensate for the zero or artificially low costs imputed to raw materials
and upstream goods.
27 (World Bank 1990).
28 China accounted for 60 percent of world production of raw silk and 90 percent of world export.
This account is given in (Young 1997).17
arrangements, claims over financial flows are apportioned between the central government and
regional governments according to an administrative principle. China’s tax system defines tax
base not by the residency of the firm but by the level of governmental administration. Broadly
speaking, income tax revenues generated by the regionally-owned and operated enterprises
accrue to the regional governments whereas income tax revenues generated by enterprises owned
and operated by the central government accrue to the central government.
29
The Chinese economic system classifies enterprises according to their level of
administrative supervision. An enterprise is categorized as a "central enterprise" (zhongyang
qiye) if the control rights—managerial appointments, asset disposals, strategic directions of
firms—and some or all of the income rights reside with the central government in Beijing. A
regional enterprise (difang qiye), as the name suggests, is such that the same control and income
rights belong to a regional government. Regional enterprises can be further divided into
provincial enterprises (shengshu qiye) or city or county enterprises (shishu or xianshu qiye). In
1995, according to the Third Industry Census, there were 87,905 industrial SOEs, of which
83,167 were owned by the regional governments. The regionally-owned SOEs accounted for 65
percent of the total SOE assets and 64 percent of sales. Among the regionally-owned SOEs, most
of the firms are controlled by the county-level governments. County governments controlled
50,123 SOEs out of 83,167 regionally-owned SOEs.
30 During the reform era, the single most
important development that affected tax divisions between the central government and regional
governments was the delegation of control rights to regional governments, thus increasing the tax
base of the regional governments. During the 1986-1990 period, the central government directly
collected 33 percent of consolidated tax revenue; by 1993, the central share declined to 22
percent. The 1994 tax reforms, which created a federalist tax structure, restored some of the
fiscal control by the center. In 1997, the central share rose to 49 percent. On the expenditure side,
however, regional governments have remained dominant. In 1997, they accounted for 71 percent
of the consolidated expenditure, roughly the same share before the 1994 tax reforms.
                                                     
29 The 1994 tax reforms, for the first time, sought to alter the foundation of this tax-sharing
principle. The gist of the reforms was to institute a federalist tax system in which central and regional
authorities operate their own tax collection apparatuses and the tax base was no longer defined
administratively but by different tax categories. Despite the fact that the principle of tax federalism guided
much of the 1994 tax reforms, a number of analysts commented that the actual tax collection practices still
bear some of the remnant of the old system.
30 The data are from the 1995 industrial census. See (Office of Third Industrial Census 1997).18
The dominant view in the studies of Chinese economy attributes the rise of local
protectionism and developmental incentives favoring local infant industries to this system of tax
divisions and to the economic reforms that assigned greater fiscal flows and economic control to
regional governments. The forward integration and export restraints on raw materials, whose
prices were artificially depressed, essentially channeled resources into regional tax base and
constituted activities by regional authorities to maximize their tax revenues. During reform era,
according to this interpretation, as regional authorities gained more fiscal and economic controls,
local protectionism and development of local infant industries gathered momentum.  The
prescription to remedy the “fragmentation problem” in the Chinese economy often advocates a
recentralization of financial resources and economic and managerial functions in the hands of the
central government.
This analysis blaming “excessive” decentralization provides only an incomplete
explanation. For one thing, despite the widely-acknowledged fragmentation effect of this way of
administering the tax collection and assigning control and income rights of SOEs, the system
enjoys a remarkable resiliency. The administrative tax divisions and dividing controls of firms by
levels of government have a long history in China. Although there have been many revisions and
modifications, the broad principle of administrative tax divisions was laid out in the early 1950s,
rather than during the reform era. The genesis of the system was a circular which the State
Council issued in March 1951 entitled, "The Decision to Establish a Tax Division System for
1951." This was a milestone in the history of China’s tax system as the basic principle of the
administrative definition of tax base was enshrined in this document. The circular created a
three-tier system of budgetary administration—central government, large administrative regions,
and provinces—and defined the tax base of each level of the government as constituting those
firms being administered by a particular level of government. Initially, lower-level governments,
such as provinces, only administered a few firms and thus commanded only a small tax base but
over time, their tax base expanded as more and more firms were assigned to their control. During
the reform era since the early 1980s, a second round of fiscal delegation took place, which
divided the tax base of a regional government—say a province—into several and relatively
independent tax bases. Thus municipal enterprises paid taxes going into municipal coffers and
county enterprises paid taxes going into county coffers. But the fundamental principle of defining
tax base administratively predated economic reforms by almost three decades.
Nor is local control of SOEs a new development unique to the reform era. In fact, prior
to the advent of reforms, Chinese economy was already quite decentralized. As a number of19
commentators noted, China was never a centrally planned economy after the image of the Soviet
model. It was more of a regionally planned economy.
31 Despite many of the similarities in their
economic systems during what Kornai calls "the classical stage of socialism," there were some
sharp differences between the Soviet and Chinese systems. In general, the Chinese system was
much less decentralized as compared with the Soviet system even at the height of central
planning in the mid-1960s. For example, the Chinese State Planning Commission allocated just
over 500 product categories compared to some 50,000 products allocated by the Soviet central
planning agency.
32 In the early 1980s, for example, the central government directly owned only 3
percent of the 83,000 enterprises (Wong 1985 ) and, in terms of industrial output, SOEs
subordinate to the central ministries only accounted for 9 percent of total industrial output for the
state sector (He Jianzhang and Wang Jiye 1984).
33 The tax derivation as a function of
administrative supervision of firms is a long-standing and well-entrenched principle in the
Chinese economic system. In an interesting case in 1980, when the central government attempted
to transfer some of the firms to central control, the central government agreed that the original
“owners”—in this case provincial governments—would still claim 20 percent of the income-tax
revenue generated by enterprises previously under their supervision.
34
What the conventional analysis ignores is that this decentralized tax and SOE
administration is inherently rational in the context of state ownership of firms. Fundamentally,
assigning more control and income rights of SOEs to lower-level governments is one of the few
available tools to improve efficiency in a socialist economy. State ownership of assets means that
the government is the rightful owner and thus it is entitled to the exercise of many ownership
                                                     
31 See (Donnithorne 1981 ) and (Qian and Xu 1993).
32 I have compared Chinese and Soviet central planning elsewhere in greater detail. See (Huang
1994  ).
33 In the 1980s there were both centralizing and decentralizing shifts. Between 1982 and 1987, the
Center established three nationwide corporations for the petrochemical industry, the automobile industry,
and for the nonferrous metals industry and in the process re-centralized enterprises in these three sectors.
On the other hand, enterprises in machine-building, electronics, textiles, and metallurgy were given over to
local governments. The net impact was a moderate increase in the share of central industrial output; in
1985, the central government accounted for some 25 percent of industrial output (State Council and State
Planning Commission 1990).
34 For more in-depth analyses of the evolution of China’s tax system, see (Wu Deming 1987),
(Lardy 1978 ), (Wong 1991  ), and (Wong, Heady et al. 1995).20
rights such as choosing managers, transferring and disposing of assets, and deciding on the
general strategic directions of the firm. But in exercising these rights, a bureaucracy runs into a
perennial problem: It simply does not have the requisite information in right quantity and quality
to exercise these rights wisely. As (Hayek 1974 ) famously argues, most of economic information
is inherently complex. Consumer preferences are atomistic and unique to "circumstances of place
and time" and, above all, are ever-changing. On the production side, the same problem arises
from the heterogeneity of products and production processes. A central bureaucracy is inherently
handicapped to collect and process this type of information in a timely manner. A local
bureaucracy, while not necessarily up to the task completely, at least is better able to respond
more quickly to the ever changing and varied economic exigencies. This is so because
bureaucracy is not only unable to collect the sufficient amount of information, it also loses the
information it does collect. Because information goes through many administrative layers in a
bureaucracy, information that has been collected get lost, as (Lindbeck 1971 ) points out.
The informational requirements of managing economic affairs from Beijing are nothing
short of mind-boggling. In the 1980s, routinely each year, between 10,000 and 30,000 new
investment projects broke ground. Given the large number of investment projects at any given
point in time, it is simply administratively impossible for the central government to review each
project carefully and to follow the project cycles at each step of the project life. Indeed, even the
provincial officials feel that they do not have sufficient information and staff resources to
evaluate investment projects at the prefectural and county levels, which prompted them in 1984
to request a further delegation of review authority.
35 In 1997, there were over 110,000 industrial
SOEs alone. The informational requirements of running these numerous firms are simply beyond
the capacity of a single bureaucracy. As long as the Chinese state insists on retaining the control
rights over these firms in the hands of the government, the enormous managerial and
administrative complexities leave no choice but to partition control rights among different
branches or levels of bureaucracy. Decentralization of income rights, in many ways, serves the
same purpose of alleviating the intrinsic complexities of running a socialist economy.
Fundamentally, it is an incentive device to ensure that regional governments put their resources
to create value as the system allows them to retain a portion of the value creation. The effect of
this system is to ease the need for the central government to constantly monitor and supervise the
                                                     
35 For a more detailed illustration of this informational problem in managing investment projects
from the Center, see (Huang 1996).21
actions of the regional governments. Given the inordinately high informational requirements of
running a socialist economy, administrative delegation of tax collection and firm management is
an efficiency-improving tool and is thus “rational” given these constraints. In other words,
economic fragmentation is a costly by-product of a conscious decision by the state to preserve
socialism while searching for a way to minimize the high informational costs of operating such
an economic system.
The role of state ownership needs to be taken into account explicitly when considering
the effect of decentralization on rent-seeking motives and behavior on the part of regional
governments. China’s decentralization attempt is of an administrative kind: It moved managerial
responsibilities and financial resources from a higher level of bureaucracy to a lower level
bureaucracy. It is not an economic decentralization, which moved the same responsibilities and
resources out of the sphere of government and into the hands of private entities and
entrepreneurs. The absence of an economic decentralization also explains another anomaly—
China’s decentralization so far has enhanced profit incentives but not self-reinforcing cost
constraints. Building up local infant industries costs a lot of money and a cost-constrained
investor would maximize expected payoffs, not current payoffs. Expected payoffs are a function
not just of one’s own investments but investments by one’s competitors. During the reform era,
as many regional governments poured massive resources into virtually identical product lines
(such as automobiles and electronics) the expected payoffs should be lower than the current
payoffs. The reasoning is straightforward. The new facilities will come online and a greater
supply of goods in temporary shortage will diminish the current profit margins. Normally this
kind of competitive dynamics deters an investor sitting on the sideline, but for some reason,
investments by competitor provinces do not exert such a deterrence effect in China. In the mid-
1990s, as the evidence of overcapacity in automobile and electronics production became
abundantly clear, no less than twenty provinces targeted electronics industry for further
development. Additional nineteen provinces declared that they would target automobile
production for development.
36
In a typical centrally planned economy, there is a fundamental asymmetry in the
incidence of costs and benefits associated with undertaking investment activities. Benefits--
enhanced reputation and higher financial rewards--accrue to the bureaucratic shareholders and
SOE managers; investment costs and costs of investment failures, on the other hand, are borne by
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the society at large.  (Kornai 1992 , p. 163) comments,  “Expansion drive is a fact of life for the
bureaucracy. And because this system has only bureaucrats and no real owners, there is an almost
total lack of internal, self-imposed restraint that might resist this drive.”  Socialists firms are said
to face “soft budget constraints,” which refer to bureaucratic readiness to provide financial
assistance and, ultimately, to prevent bankruptcy.
37 (Grosfeld 1989 ) comments, “[S]oftness of
the budget means that there is no danger of a forced exit.  Even if enterprises have to repay
credits (which is not always necessary) insolvency is not a real threat; they can always rely on
subsidies, price adjustment, tax facilities, and so on.”  Soft budget constraints, in essence, imply
zero risks for the investment activities undertaken by SOEs and are an important reason why
restraint on capital spending by SOEs is not self-enforcing. This affects investment calculus of
regional officials strongly. They are positively biased toward the success of any investment
project they launch and tend to systematically discount the risks that are entailed. Over-
investment is inevitable as a result of this dynamic.
38
Decentralization per se does not explain why economic fragmentation has gone to such
an extreme extent in China. Given the high profit margins in the downward sectors, it is not
surprising that regional governments are motivated to erect trade barriers against goods from
foreign provinces. What is puzzling is the dramatic extent internal trade has been reduced by the
actions of Chinese regional governments. Trade barriers aside, domestic borders are far more
open or porous than international borders. One indication is the relative unfettered movement of
people across Chinese provinces. The size of migrant and transient labor is huge, estimated
                                                     
37 For a classic illustration of soft-budget constraints, see (Kornai 1980 ).
38 To be sure, one can cite similar examples of weak or absent self-enforcing restraints on
investment activities in capitalistic economies but the important point is that typically, this type of behavior
results from some degree of governmental bearing of investment costs. For example, the reckless lending
behavior by the savings and loans institutions in the United States in the 1970s was in part, rooted in the
fact that they were federally insured and thus they faced softer budget constraints. Similarly, Paul Krugman
analyzed the moral hazard factors that led to the onset of financial crisis in Asia in 1997.  In his model,
because banks were insured by the government against credit default, borrowing firms were encouraged to
pursue “Panglossian” value rather than a realistic prospect of profitability. The idea is that since firms did
not bear the costs of failures they were positively biased toward project success and were willing to go
ahead with a project even if the project only had a slim chance of being successful.23
around 100 million at a given point in time in the 1990s.
39 Poor and labor-surplus provinces have
developed active programs to export labor to labor-deficit regions. It is thus somewhat of an
anomaly that such a large movement of people is not associated with large-scale arbitrage
activities that may naturally arise to take advantage of the opportunities created by the apparent
interregional price differentials.
A plausible answer to this apparent puzzle is that marketing channels and investment
processes are still subject to far more stringent political controls by China’s regional
governments than the nascent and emerging labor market. One straightforward piece of evidence
is the statist nature of China’s distribution system. Although there has been some progress in
reforming Chain’s distribution system, it is important to point out that progress here is typically
defined as a decline in the role of the state in allocating goods. It does not refer to the decline of
the role of the state in distributing goods. This is a significant distinction. Sate allocation means
that the state makes decisions about who gets what, rather than letting market make those
decisions. Distribution is the process whereby goods go from the producer to the end-user.
During the reform era, the total number of categories of consumer goods allocated through plan
was 274; it was only fourteen in 1992. In value terms, goods subject to governmental allocation
accounted for 90 percent of total goods in circulation in 1980; by 1992, it declined to 12
percent.
40
The state still retains a paramount role in distribution. The de-statization of marketing
functions of the economy was more substantial in agriculture than in industry. In 1984, for
example, the government, for the first time, permitted individual farmers to engage in long-
distance transport of their produce, to use motor vehicles in trade and to purchase motor vehicles
for transport. However, numerous restrictions were imposed at the same time. For example,
farmer-traders needed to obtain separate permits for trading, vehicle and passes for cross-
jurisdictional transport.
41 Although these restrictions seemed exacting, liberalization in the urban
areas was even more limited. Compared to industrial production, ownership diversification in the
service sector--especially in wholesaling, retailing and banking--has not happened at all. In 1996,
for example, while the SOEs only accounted for less than 40 percent of the output value in
                                                     
39 For a careful recent study on migration issues in China, see (Solinger 1999).
40 See (World Bank 1994)  p.69
41 Detailed in  [Wedeman 2000 #2129]  pp.46-4724
industry, service SOEs accounted for 54.2 percent of the retail sales and 66.8 percent of the
wholesales. To put these numbers in perspective, in 1965 and 1978, SOEs accounted for the 53
percent and 53.5 percent of the retail sales. This is indeed remarkable. During the height of the
centrally planned era, industrial production was completely monopolized by the SOEs while
some leeway was allowed for non-state firms in the service sector. Twenty years of economic
reforms have not attenuated the near state monopoly in distribution at all.
42 Collective firms,
many of whom are quasi- SOEs, accounted for the rest. In 1996, collective firms generated 29.8
percent of retail sales and 25.4 percent of wholesales. In foreign trade, the dominance of the
SOEs is nearly absolute. In 1996, SOEs accounted for 89.9 percent of import business. Truly
non-state firms, such as private firms and FIEs were simply non-consequential. In 1996, private
firms accounted for 1.3 percent of the wholesale business and 2.77 percent of the retail sales.
43
The inconsequential role of the private firms in the distributional sector, in part, reflects the
detailed restrictions placed on private involvement. For example, only private natural persons—
private corporations—were granted trading permits. This severely restricts the extent of private
involvement in China’s distributional sector.
                                                     
42 Two caveats need to be added to this statement. First, because marketing functions have been
granted directly to firms themselves, it is conceivable that non-state production firms can engage in buying
and selling activities without going through the state-controlled marketing channels. This change would not
be reflected in the statistics cited in the text. It is quite possible that when direct marketing data are
included, the non-state sector would appear to be more important simply because the production role of the
SOEs has shrunk. But this is unrelated to reforms in the service sector per se and this is not inconsistent
with the observation that service sectoral reforms have lagged behind. Second, the retail sales data for 1965
and 1978 include restaurant business whereas the 1996 data do not. Strictly speaking, the two sets of data
are not comparable. Because one area of service sector that has witnessed an active involvement of private
firms is the restaurant business, including restaurant business in our tabulation will distort our analysis,
which is concerned with sales of goods. Obviously, the inclusion of the restaurant business data for 1965
and 1978 would exaggerate the extent of the SOEs dominating in goods transactions but the bias should be
modest. As is well-known, in a centrally planned economy, restaurant business was under-developed and its
value in the total retail sales was probably very small. The 1965 and 1978 data come from (World Bank
1994).
43 Retail, wholesale and import data, broken down by ownership of the distributional units, are
reported in (State Statistical Bureau 1997).25
The state ownership of the distributional units makes it more likely that service SOEs act
as developmental tools on behest of regional governments. Indeed, anedoctal accounts suggest
that a frequent protectionist tactic is restrictions imposed on the state-owned marketing
institutions to import goods from other provinces.
44 The absence of genuine competition from
profit-minded private firms in the service sector probably have prolonged the regionalized rental
accumulation longer than it would have persisted otherwise. If the political control over
marketing institutions had been less effectual, one would have observed substantial arbitrage
activities between the protected provinces and foreign provinces. Price differentials among
different provinces and supernormal profit margins between upstream and downstream
production would have disappeared faster than they actually did. The fact that local
protectionism persisted over the entire reform era and an apparent absence of sizable black
market activities are evidence of the extent of the state controls over marketing channels.
45
A case study of economic fragmentation: Automotive industry
Probably, the best illustration of the extent of economic fragmentation in China is the
country’s automotive industry. Automotive industry is among the most scale-intensive industries.
In industries characterized by scale economies, large firms enjoy cost advantages over smaller
firms.
 Economy of scale means that there are increasing returns to scale within a large range of
production volume, i.e., average costs fall when the volume of production increases.
46
                                                     
44 (Wedeman 2000) gave many such accounts.
45 There were press reports about smuggling activities in raw materials, especially agricultural raw
materials, such as cotton. But press accounts of smuggling activities in manufactured goods are surprisingly
scant. This could result from greater controls by the state over marketing of manufactured goods.
Smuggling in raw materials, especially agriculturally-based raw materials, could be more frequent because
of the greater relaxation on private trading in the agricultural sector.
46 Throughout this chapter, economy of scale (EOS) refers to what is known as “internal economy
of scale” in economics, i.e., economy of scale that arises at the plant level. EOS is also refers to economy of
scale at the industry level and this is known as “external EOS.” External EOS is used to explain why firms
in certain industries are concentrated geographically, e.g., service firms in New York City, computer firms
in Silicon Valley or automotive firms around Detroit. Even a casual examination of Chinese automotive
industry shows the lack of external EOS. Automotive firms are highly dispersed and can be found in 28 out26
Commonly, economy of scale is measured in terms of minimum efficient scale (MES), i.e., the
minimum absolute scale of production required for efficiency. For vehicle assembly, the MES is
commonly given around 250,000 units at the plant level and for a single basic model type.
47 The
MES for other automotive products is similarly large. For example, for engines and
transmissions, the estimates ranged between 250,000 units to one million units.
The exacting MES requirements for the automotive production often mean that
automotive firms in developing economies are inefficient because they operate and service small
markets. They incur significant “the economy of scale cost penalty” by operating below MES
(Altshuler, Anderson et al. 1986: 39). China is an extreme example of an automotive industry
plagued by scale diseconomies. In 1995, China produced 1.45 million motor vehicles. While this
represents a ten fold increase in a span of  seventeen years and China is now the world’s eleventh
largest producer of motor vehicles after Brazil, Chinese automotive industry is the most
fragmented in the world. The 1.45 million volume was spread among some 122 assembly
enterprises and many vehicular classifications and models, with an average volume about 12,000
units per firm.
48 The passenger car assembly is similarly fragmented. As of 1995, there were 15
passenger car assembly firms with a total output of 326,000 units, averaging 21,726 units per
firm. To drive these numbers home further, it is worth noting that the entire output volume of 122
assembly firms in China is smaller than the output level of one single Japanese firm in 1969,
Toyota (1.45 million compared with 1.47 million units) and about the same level of Hyundai
Motors in 1996, 1.3 million units (Schuman and Reitman 1997). The entire passenger car output
volume of 15 assemblers in 1995 was about the same as that of Nissan in 1967 (352,045 units)
and only a third of Toyota in 1969 (964,088 units).
49
                                                                                                                                                             
of 30 provinces in China. Only two highly agricultural and barren provinces, Tibet and Qinghai, do not have
their own automotive plants.
47 Estimates vary among different experts but they all fall within 250,000 and 300,000 range. See .
(Baranson 1969), (Pratten 1971), (Rhys 1972), and (White 1971).
48 The 122 figure does not include those firms/plants that specialize in outfitting chassis to special
purpose vehicles as well as those plants specializing in components production. As of 1995, there were 536
such outfitting outlets and 55 engine and 1638 components plants.
49 In 1995, China’s entire output volume of truck production was roughly comparable to the
volume of the largest Japanese automotive makers in the late 1960s. China produced 571,751 units of
trucks, as compared with 442,621 for Nissan and 492,196 for Toyota in 1969.27
Even when the lowest estimates are used, it is clear that the Chinese automotive industry
operates far below the MES across the entire spectrum of the automotive production. In 1995, the
top producer of automotive engines churned out a volume of 177,000 units, as compared with the
MES ranging from 250,000 to 1 million. The output of the largest producer of medium-duty
trucks was 125,000 units while the number one car manufacturer, Shanghai Volkswagen (SVW),
had an output volume of 160,000 after years of hovering below 100,000 units. Since 1996, SVW
significantly expanded its production. In 1998, its output volume reached 235,000 units, far
larger than FAW, which produced 168,351 units.
Because automotive industry is scale-intensive, the miniturization of automotive
production must be rooted in China-specific factors rather than in the industry dynamics. One
way to illustrate this point is to compare China with other countries. The idea here is that
underlying economic factors tend to drive concentration ratios to similar levels across different
countries. Many economic studies have indeed found that concentration ratios in market
economies are rooted in production technology, scale economies and the use of the product
rather than in the country-specific factors. Thus same industries tend to exhibit similar
concentration ratios across countries and to the extent concentration ratios within the same
industry differ the cause lies in the country-specific factors.
50
Table 1
Table 1 compares China with Brazil, Japan and Korea during the 1960s, 1970s and
1980s. These countries, like China in the 1990s, attempted to enter the automotive sector
dominated by the large incumbent players. Two clear contrasts are evident. One is that as
measured by one to three-firm ratios, Chinese automotive industry is far more fragmented both at
the beginning and at the end of the period for comparison. In 1985, the one-firm ratio was 19.2
percent in China, as compared with 24.8 percent in Brazil (1959), 32.1 percent in Japan (1960),
and 54.6 percent in Korea (1960).  The second contrast is the trend. Among all three benchmark
countries the automotive industry became more concentrated over time; in China, however, over
time, the automotive industry became less concentrated.  In 1985, for example, the three-firm
ratio was 43 percent in China but it declined to 33.3 percent in 1995 and 37.8 percent in 1996. In
the 1990s, the concentration ratios stayed at a low and stable level despite the government’s
effort in 1994 to streamline the industry. Only in the most recent years (1997 and 1998), the
declining trends in concentration ratios were arrested somewhat. Apart from production
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technology, market size also drives industrial structure. A larger market size can support a larger
number of firms than a smaller market size. The last column of Table 1 shows that the market
size for Chinese automotive makers in the 1990s—between 1 and 1.6 million--is only a fraction
of Japan’s market size (6.94 million) and is only moderately larger than Korea’s market size
(0.97 million) during the comparable periods. Thus China’s far lower and decreasing
concentration ratios are even more glaring on top of a relatively small market.
Asset market fragmentation is indicated by the sizeable differences on returns on assets
(ROAs) across different regions and their persistence over time.  ROAs are calculated for the
passenger car segment of China’s automobile industry, for two years, 1993 and 1995. Financial
returns are given as the pre-tax profits and assets are the sum of net fixed asset stock and the
working capital. For 1993, for the 15 firms in the passenger car segment, the coefficient of
variation for their ROAs is 2.26; in 1995, it is 2.22. The ROAs ranged from –0.11 to 0.56 in 1993
and from –0.17 to 0.648 in 1995. The increasing competition on the product apparently has not
equalized returns on assets.
Creating a regional supply base: The case of SAIC
In this section, I undertake a case study of Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation
(SAIC) to illustrate the dynamics whereby fragmentation in this scale-intensive industry occurs.
51
SAIC is China’s second largest automotive producer in China. In 1998, it had more than 40
billion yuan in assets, compared to 64.9 billion yuan of First Automotive Work (FAW), China’s
largest and the first automotive producer. Measured in sales, however, SAIC is larger. In 1998,
SAIC generated 39.5 billion yuan in revenues while FAW generated 36.8 billion yuan. Its star
product, Santana, accounts for 50 percent of passenger cars sold in China annually and in 1998
SAIC launched the Buick manufacturing operation via a US$1.5 billion joint venture with GM,
which promised to put SAIC on the world’s technological frontier in automotive manufacturing.
For years, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation consistently ranked SAIC’s
                                                     
51 The sustained effort on the part SAIC to develop in-house capabilities in components production
is documented by a number of researchers. A thorough and careful study by Eric Thun documents a high
level of political and policy commitment on the part of Shanghai government to transform the automotive
industry into a pillar industry in Shanghai. This section of the chapter draws from his work as well as other
sources cited in the book.29
flagship affiliate, Shanghai Volkswagen (SVW), as the number one among the top 500 FIEs in
China on the basis of annual sales.
52
But as recently as 1990, SAIC was one of the several automotive firms trying to get into
China’s fast growing market for passenger cars. In Beijing, it faced competition from Beijing
Automotive Industry Corporation (BAIC), whose flagship affiliate, Beijing Jeep Corporation
(BJC), produced a popular sports-utility vehicle, Cherokee. BJC was a joint venture between
BAIC and Chrysler. In the south, it faced competition from Guangzhou Peugeot, which
manufactured a mid-sized sedan. SAIC was also behind in product quality. In a 1988
comprehensive quality inspection, one of its car models, SH760A, received only a passing score
of 83.63 (out of 100). It was rated down particularly in its reliability category, receiving 14 out of
20 points in this department. BJC received a score of 90.11 while the Chinese parent of
Guangzhou Peugeot, Guangzhou Automotive Work, received a score of 90.25.
53  The quality of a
vehicle can be directly measured by its failure rate and the standard measure used in the industry
is MTBF (miles traveled between failures). For the Shanghai car, the MTBF was 1,250 km,; for
BJC, it was 2,500 km.
54 By 1996, however, SAIC had defeated its rivals. Its Santana subsidiary,
Shanghai Volkswagen (SVW), generated a sales revenue roughly four times of BJC and
Guangzhou Peugeot combined.
Table 2 summarizes the sharply divergent developments of SAIC and BAIC during the
course of the 1990s. As recently 1990s, the two firms were roughly comparable in size and their
performance. BAIC was larger in size as measured by sales revenue but a bit smaller as measured
by assets. Its gross margins were lower, at 7.11 percent, as compared with 9.57 percent for SAIC
but the difference was by no means large. In fact, BAIC seemed to possess some modest
advantages in the composition of its workforce. As measured by the share of technicians of the
workforce, the ratio for BAIC was 25.9 whereas for SAIC, it was 14.7. By 1997, the two firms
                                                     
52  Sun Hong, "Shanghai Volkswagen:  No. 1 of overseas funded," China Daily, November 2, 1996.
53 Guangzhou Automotive Work was later renamed Guangzhou Automotive Industry Corporation.
54 The Guangzhou vehicle had the same MTBF as the Shanghai car but it was considerably better
in another quality dimension: The mileage traveled before the first failure. For Guangzhou car, it was
1,469.5 km; for the Shanghai car, it was only 386.5 km. To illustrate how shoddy the Shanghai car was,
386.5 km (242 miles) is roughly the distance between Boston and New York city. Thus a brand new car
manufactured by SAIC in 1988 would experience its first failure by making a one-way trip from Boston to
New York. The data from the 1988 comprehensive quality inspection are given in (Ministry of Machinery
Industry 1991).30
have grown apart. SAIC is now dominant over BAIC in every conceivable dimension. It is
several multiples of the size of BAIC, as measured by both sales revenue and assets. Its sales
revenue was 4.5 times that of BAIC and its assets, 3.11 times. Its share of technical personnel in
the workforce has grown whereas for BAIC it shrank. Profitability difference between the two
firms grew apart significantly. SAIC was able to grow its gross margins further from its already
healthy starting position in 1990, from 9.57 to 13.73, but during the same period, BAIC was
losing money.
Table 2
Two developments accompanied the rise of SAIC to the industry leadership position.
First, it relied heavily on the financing and technological capabilities of the MNCs. Second, since
the mid-1980s, it has pursued an aggressive strategy of creating a components supply base in
Shanghai by engaging in an expensive and systematic backward integration. The next section of
this chapter will link these two developments together by arguing that the strategy of creating a
supply base in Shanghai deepened SAIC’s dependency on FDI. For now, let me focus on and
describe the effort by SAIC to create a supply base in Shanghai.
SAIC’s strategy to create a supplier base in Shanghai, mainly to supply automotive
components to its flagship affiliate, SVW, was extremely successful. (Success here is defined as
the construction of a supply base that was previously not there.)  In 1990, Shanghai was not a
center of automotive components manufacturing. Its automotive output value only accounted for
7 percent of the national total as compared with 11.2 percent by Beijing and 9 percent by Sichuan
(--a traditional components manufacturing base because of presence of many military plants).
Measured in sales terms, Shanghai also lagged behind Beijing. It accounted for 8 percent of the
sales revenue in automotive components as compared with 12.3 percent for Beijing. By 1996,
their roles reversed with each other. Shanghai accounted for 20 percent of the output value in
automotive components manufacturing, 14.2 percent of the net fixed assets and 22.2 percent of
the sales revenue. For Beijing, however, the shares declined to 4.32 percent in output value; 5.44
percent in net fixed assets and 4.74 percent in terms of sales revenue.
The rise in Shanghai’s importance in components manufacturing resulted from a shift in
SAIC’s sourcing patterns. First, SAIC increasingly produced inhouse what it had previously
sourced from outside. By value, as of 1990, outsourcing constituted 65 percent of the Santana
components that were produced in China. Over time, this share was to decline, contrary to the
worldwide trend of increasing components outsourcing in the automotive industry. In 1997,
Santana’s domestic content rate reached 92.7 percent. Of this 92.7 percent, between 88 to 9031
percent by value was produced within Shanghai and of the amount supplied in Shanghai, 50
percent of them came from firms within SAIC group. By 1997, the outsourcing share was 50
percent by value, meaning that of those components sourced domestically, 50 percent came from
firms not under the SAIC’s organizational umbrella. Second, there was a geographic shift in
sourcing patterns, i.e., SAIC increasingly bought components from firms located in Shanghai. In
1997, SVW’s supply network consists of 248 firms, of which 40 are affiliate firms under SAIC
and 158 are located in Shanghai. Although fewer in number, these 40 firms supply 50 percent of
the components by value, suggesting that they are capturing the high-end spectrum of the
components. 
55 This pattern of “regional sourcing” contrasts with other vehicle producers in
China. BJC, for example, sources about 20 to 30 percent of its components locally; Guangzhou
Peugeot, about 20 percent.
SAIC’s regionalization drive was methodical and well-organized. To SAIC,
regionalization entailed a simple objective: It was to replace imports not only from foreign
countries but also from foreign provinces in China. Thus a product from France was treated
exactly the same as a product from Changchun in Jilin province and the objective was to replace
it with a similar product in Shanghai. Cost was not an issue; what mattered was the physical
availability in Shanghai. In 1987, SAIC, with the full backing from the Shanghai municipal
government, began a concerted effort to create supply capabilities in Shanghai.
56 The
extraordinarily high margins of Santana sustained the SVW operation. In the late 1980s, the
production cost was 85,000 yuan per unit and the factory gate price was 104,000 yuan. The retail
price was 174,000 yuan. The difference between the factory gate and retail prices was accounted
for by a purchase fee, localization fee and special consumption tax (Zheng Lixin 1994, p. 64). In
1988, the Shanghai municipal government levied what it called a “localization tax,” which
amounted to 16 percent of the retail price of Santana at the time. This enormous amount of fund
was then plowed back as investments in Shanghai’s supply sector. Between 1988 and 1994,
Shanghai collected over 5 billion yuan through this facility. Apart from provision of enormous
financial resources, Shanghai government also acted to boost demand for Santana. It forbade the
taxi companies in Shanghai to buy cars made elsewhere to staff their taxi fleet.
                                                     
55 Thun (1999).
56 Much of this localization drive by the Shanghai government is described in (Huang and Thun
1999).  The writing of this case borrows significantly from the research and data collected by Eric Thun.32
This attempt at backward integration disrupted the existing supplier relationships that
SAIC had already developed since the mid-1980s. Because the components industry in Shanghai
was not developed, initially SAIC had no choice but to turn to existing components producers
located in other provinces in order to economize on precious foreign exchange expenditures.
Supposedly, SAIC was to create a “China brand, not a Shanghai brand.” To that end, in 1987,
SAIC signed long-term contracts to source components from thirteen firms based in Guizhou
province in southwest China. Guizhou province, although not an industrial powerhouse, had built
up a large aeronautical industry in the 1960s and 1970s as a part of Mao’s “third front” program
to move military-industrial production assets inland in order to shield them from a possible
Soviet attack. Supplying components to SAIC provided an opportunity for Guizhou to convert
their military production assets into civilian production assets.
In the 1990s, however, SAIC began to shift its components-sourcing away from firms
based in Guizhou province, severing its ties with supplier firms in that province. This is what
happened to Guizhou Honghu Machinery (Guizhou Honghu). Guizhou Honghu had a contract
with SAIC to supply muffler systems.
57 In 1992, Guizhou Honghu was the largest producer of the
muffler systems, producing in that year 131,140 units while the production volume for Santana
that year was 58,328. Guizhou Honghu solidified its market leadership in the next three years; by
1995, its output volume increased to 225,000 units. During this period, the firm added capacity.
Its employees grew from 2,870 to 2,890. Its fixed assets grew from 47.65 million yuan to 65.63
million yuan. In constant prices, the firm’s output value grew by 68 percent. However, in 1996,
its output volume fell suddenly and precipitously, to 57,778, a reduction of almost 300 percent
from the 1995 level.
What happened was that SAIC terminated its contract with Guizhou Honghu and turned
to one of its own subsidiaries for its muffler systems. A Shanghai muffler producer increased its
output volume from 175,000 in 1995 to 280,000 in 1996. The financial impact was immediate
and dramatic. In 1995, the returns on assets were 2.26 percent for the Shanghai firm; in 1996, it
increased to 15.8 percent.  Guizhou Honghu’s output value, in constant prices, plummeted by 28
percent in a single year. The firm, an SOE, cut its workforce drastically, from 2,890 to 1,276. In
1997, the firm did somewhat better as it now found other customers for its products. It apparently
won contracts to supply to FAW-Volkswagen and Nanjing-Inveco for their Jetta and Iveco series.
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Its workforce recovered to 2,829 but its financial performance continued to suffer. Its output
value increased by 22.75 percent in 1996 but plunged again in 1997, by 23.6 percent, reflecting
the high volatility of the this particular market segment without a stable source of demand for its
products from the largest car manufacturer in China.
The systematic effort by SAIC to replace existing suppliers could not have happened
without the high level of political support from the Shanghai municipal government. From the
very beginning, the mayor’s office set up a small “leading group” specifically to coordinate and
supervise SAIC’s regionalization strategy. Shanghai’s mayor, who happened to be Jiang Zemin,
China’s current president, assured the small leading group of his full support. “When you have
problems,” he reportedly said, “come find me. We must maintain a hot line between us.”
Shanghai municipal government and the management of SAIC had an extremely close and
revolving-door relationship. The current president of SAIC, Chen Xianglin, headed SAIC from
1983 to 1986 and then became the director of Shanghai Planning Commission until 1993. He
then moved on to be the vice party secretary of the Shanghai Communist Party Committee in
1993 and 1994. In 1995, Chen resumed the presidency of SAIC, while his predecessor, Lu Jian
took up a high level position in the Shanghai Municipal Economic Committee.
Central planning, as many comparative economists have pointed out, often fails to
allocate goods consistent with the firms' requests; either the wrong goods are assigned or simply
the requested goods are not supplied. This supply uncertainty gives rise to a strong incentive to
engage in backward integration, i.e., investing in plants and facilities to produce inputs for final
goods production.
58 In the case of SAIC, the calculus was different from the traditional concern
over supply uncertainty since SAIC bought directly from its suppliers and did not depend on the
poorly informed bureaucratic decisions. Officially, the SAIC officials often invoked the very
stringent quality and technical standard imposed by Volkswagen as a rationale for integrating
operations backward. Indeed, SAIC faced a daunting challenge to obtain quality components.
Wang Rongjun, the managing director of SVW, described the challenge facing the firm in the
mid-1980s:
59
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The technical standards of Chinese automobile component suppliers in
1986 were nearly 30 years behind component manufacturers of Europe, Japan,
and the United States.  For SVW, measures of technical excellence were in part
defined by standards dictated by its European parent, Volkswagen AG.
Furthermore, Chinese automotive suppliers in my time manufactured parts for
trucks, not cars.  We needed a fundamental shift, not only in parts design (as cars
are a little different from trucks) but also in the technology.  In the beginning
there wasn't a single local parts supplier which could produce a part we could
assemble into the Santana.
But, as the account of Guizhou Honghu makes clear, SAIC’s regionalization drive in fact
replaced existing suppliers that already successfully met the high quality standard of SVW. Thus
product quality alone is not a sufficient explanation. The strong backward integration drive
stemmed from a confluence of three factors. First, many regional governments targeted
automotive industry for development and provinces with a comparative advantage in components
production were motivated to expand into high-margin assembly operations. SAIC might have
calculated very rationally that its dependency on suppliers located in other provinces could hurt
its economic interests in the long run should supplier provinces divert components to their own
assembly operations. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in Guizhou province. Throughout
the 1990s, Guizhou province was contemplating to enter into production of a mini-car series—
called Yunque series—and by 1994, 1,600 Yunque cars were produced.
60
Second, in an industry dominated by inefficient SOEs, product quality was poor in
general. Those firms capable of producing high-quality products were thus highly valued and
could exert an enormous leverage over its vendors. For example, it could ask for a large price
increase, knowing that SAIC would have difficulties replacing it. Thus a quality components
supplier could threaten its vendor in the same way that Fisher Body threatened General Motors
when General Motors depended on Fisher Body for a line of products only Fisher Body could
produce. Quality, in an economy notorious for poor quality and scant attention to quality
improvement, was a source of firm-specific advantage and bargaining power.
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However, Yunque, which means skylark in Chinese, never took off. In 1998, its output volume remained
low, at 1,064 units and the firm was losing money. See (Ministry of Machinery Industry 1999).35
Third, should components be diverted elsewhere, SAIC would have lost more than just a
prompt delivery of quality components. It would have lost any spillover benefits associated with
a long-term contractual relationship with its suppliers. The reason again has to do with the
generalized low product quality in China’s automotive industry. To cultivate Chinese supply
firms to the technological and quality requirements acceptable to SVW—and ultimately to
Volkswagen—required a massive transfer of money, time and knowledge from SVW to its
suppliers. SAIC organized many technical training programs. Retired engineers from Germany
were invited. SAIC provided technical assistance and introduced foreign firms to its suppliers in
order to match the quality of the supply firms to the more advanced manufacturing processes at
SVW. To raise the quality of the locally-produced components, Volkswagen transferred a testing
lab from Germany to Shanghai and Volkswagen engineers worked closely with the supply firms
to tackle quality problems. 
61 A defection by an existing supplier could have been very costly to
SAIC because along with the components the spillover benefits were diverted to SAIC’s
competitors as well.
In this situation, it would make perfect sense for SAIC to integrate backward to
incorporate components production into assembly operations in order to internalize the spillover
benefits from the assembly operations to components production. Indeed, at SAIC, most of the
technical training was performed inhouse. SAIC established the Automobile Industry Training
Center, which trained supply managers and technicians from SAIC affiliates. SAIC also rotated
managers around different subsidiaries in order to diffuse knowledge and expertise throughout
the SAIC system.
To build or to acquire: The case of FAW
The potentials of a hold-up problem involved in a supplier relationship across different
political jurisdictions may motivate SAIC to resort to a backward integration. But why should
SAIC have to build a supply base from scratch to fully capture the benefits from its financial and
non-financial investments in the supplier firms? Could it, for example, simply acquire the
supplier firm with whom it had an existing contractual relationship? An acquisition might have
                                                     
61 These efforts paid off. Over time, the quality of Shanghai supply firms did rise as a result, as
indicated by the growing number of products that are assigned high grades in SVW’s internal quality audits.
Within SAIC, supply firms are assigned grades from A to C, A being the top grade. In 1990, only one
supplier was assigned A; in 1997, twenty-seven firms were so designated. The number of B designees
increased from 30 in 1990 to 203 in 1997. See (Huang and Thun 1999).36
been cheaper considering the extent of overcapacity in this industry. Reducing supply uncertainty
tells us why firms in China want to integrate their downstream and upstream production but it
does not tell us why they should choose to build a new facility rather than acquiring an existing
facility. Why creating a new facility is often favored over acquiring an existing facility requires
an understanding of those institutional factors that hamper the viability of asset acquisition
across different jurisdictions.
A remarkable fact about the Chinese economy is that assets change hands infrequently
even in situations in which no genuine ownership changes are involved, as, for example, when an
SOE is transferred from one bureaucratic agency to another. According to (Shen Yifeng and He
Yinqi 1998), the first merger and acquisition case took place in Baoding city of Hubei province
in 1984. With the direct intervention from the municipal government, a textile machinery factory
took over a smaller, loss making firm in the same city. In this instance, the acquiring firm took
over the target firm in an administrative fashion, i.e., the acquiring firm simply assumed
ownership over all the assets, debt and employees of the target firm at a zero cost. Since the two
firms belonged to the same government agency, no financial resources were needed to
consummate this  “transaction.” For the entire decade of 1980s, altogether 6,966 firms were
taken over by outside firms, which involved a transfer of assets in the amount of 8.2 billion yuan.
However, most of these merger and acquisition cases involved acquiring and target firms located
in the same jurisdictions. In reality, these were not real mergers and acquisitions since they did
not entail a change in the ownership. A better description of these cases is an organizational
process of consolidating different subsidiaries belonging to a single firm rather than genuine
asset transfers from one owner to another.
Again, as for much else in the Chinese economy, state ownership and control hampers
asset transfers. The venue that would normally facilitate takeover activities across jurisdictions is
notably inefficient in China to serve such a purpose—China’s two stock exchanges. The reason
is the stringent requirement that the government and state-owned entities retain majority equity
interests in the listed firms and that their shares be non-tradeable. According to a detailed study
of over 600 firms on Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE),
in 1995, the three main groups of shareholders, the state, the legal persons and individual
shareholders, each controlled about 30 percent of the outstanding shares. As long as the state and
legal person shareholders together exercise controlling and non-alienable equity interests, the37
two stock exchanges cannot function as “markets for corporate control.”
62 More active have been
the smaller “asset exchange centers” that emerged in the major cities in the 1990s in response to
the rising losses of the SOEs. In 1993 alone, it was reported in the Chinese press, 2,900 firms
were sold or merged through this venue and the transaction value totaled some six billion yuan.
Again, most of these transactions involved acquiring and target firms located in the same
jurisdictions. Cross-jurisdictional mergers and acquisitions have been far fewer in number.
Other institutional factors impede asset transfers. First, because of the political control of
firms, regional SOEs often serve valuable non-economic functions, which may attenuate the
incentive to sell these firms even in situations when financial considerations warrant a sale. For
example, a regional firm may promote employment in the locale or it may be the power base for
the officials in the region regardless whether or not it is making money or not. Bureaucrats
pursue multiple objectives and as long as retaining control of a firm serves one of these
objectives, they may be reluctant to surrender the control of a firm to an outsider. Second,
because SOEs are controlled by separate political entities, negotiating a sale of an SOE from one
region to another is costly in terms of the necessary effort and amount of bureaucratic
coordination required. For one thing, it is an extremely difficult to negotiate an acquisition price.
Theoretically, all the SOEs only have one owner—the state—and because asset transfers have
been administrative affairs, there has not been an accounting framework that readily determines
the financial basis of an acquisition. The benchmarks are simply not there to guide these
transactions.
A more important cause of high negotiation costs is that any given asset deal requires
negotiations between two bureaucratic agencies. Direct communication between separate
                                                     
62 The reluctance to relinquish state’s control rights over the listed firms is amply illustrated by the
composition of the board membership. The board membership of the listed companies is not proportional to
the ownership. Although individual shareholding constituted 30 percent of the outstanding shares, according
to (Xu and Wang 1997), the boards of 154 companies that on average individual shareholders only
occupied less than 0.3 percent of the seats on average but on the other hand the state was over-represented
on the boards. On average, the state retained 50 percent of the seats even though its equity shares amounted
to 30 percent. There are no proxy voting procedures, which puts individual shareholders in a
disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the institutional investors such as a government agency. This usurpation
of the rightful shareholder power is direct evidence that the state harbors no intention of relinquishing its
control rights even over those firms that have been partially privatized.38
bureaucratic agencies is no easy affair because there is not a ready channel to facilitate such
communication. Information flows flow up and down through vertical channels but not
horizontally among equally-ranked bureaucratic agencies. This is a hallmark of a politically
centralized system designed to maximize power and supervision of the central authority. In
China, for example, agencies with equal ranks are explicitly forbidden to issue policy documents
to each other. Central ministries and provincial governments have the same ranks and thus a
ministry cannot dispatch decrees to a province even if the issue in question falls within the
regulatory jurisdiction of the ministry.
63 In part because of these formal restrictions on direct
communications and in part because of other informal mechanisms, China specialists use words
such as “fragmented authoritarianism” to describe the operations of the Chinese bureaucratic
system.
64
Probably, the best example of the kind of institutional impediments to cross-
jurisdictional acquisition is provided by a firm which has pursued an acquisition strategy most
aggressively. This is FAW. The way it has acquired numerous facilities currently under its
organizational umbrella provides a fascinating account of both the process and the requirements
of asset acquisitions in the Chinese economy. FAW is known as the “cradle of automotive
industry” during the PRC period.
65 It was founded in 1956 and was one of the 156 large-scale
industrial assistance projects the Soviet Union provided to China in the 1950s. FAW relied
completely on Soviet engineering expertise, design and equipment. The first FAW product was
“Jiefang” (or Liberation), a four-ton truck series designed by the Soviet engineers. Of the entire
production, 81 percent of the parts came from the Soviet Union. In 1958, FAW produced China’s
first passenger car, “Red Flag,” a luxury model based closely on the Daimler-Benz 200 sedan.
66
During the reform era, while SAIC spent heavily to create a supplier base in Shanghai, FAW
                                                     
63 This aspect of bureaucratic operation in China is dealt with in (Huang 1996).
64 See (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988).
65 China’s first automobile manufacturer--Minsheng Factory—was built as early as 1919 and the
first cargo truck was assembled in 1931. In 1936, the nationalist government established the China
Automobile Production Company. The company received technical and production assistance from German
manufacturer, Mercedes-Benz. But its volume remained low and then the Sino-Japanese war and the
ensuing civil war disrupted the industry severely. The history of China’s automotive industry is described in
(Harwit 1995 ).
66 The second car model, Phoenix, was introduced by Shanghai Automotive Plant, the predecessor
of SAIC.39
acquired facilities across the country either as a market-entry strategy to venture into new
product areas (such as light-duty trucks) or as a backward-integration strategy to acquire
components-manufacturing capabilities (such as gears and engines).
What accounts for the ability of FAW to overcome the aforementioned institutional
impediments to an acquisition strategy? The answer lies in the institutional configuration of
FAW itself. FAW is a central-government firm. Its management is appointed by the Ministry of
Machinery Industry (MMI) in Beijing and this means that Jilin province, in which FAW is
located, exerts relatively little influences over the operation of FAW.
67 FAW’s status as a
centrally-controlled firm also matters for its funding and tax base. Most of its funds come from
the central government, rather than from Jilin province. Conversely, most of its remittances go to
the coffers of the central government rather than to that of the provincial government. In the
Chinese planning parlance, FAW is known as a separately-listed firm in the central plan (jihua
danlie qiye). For a separately-listed firm the investment funds and some of the requisite inputs
FAW needs are allocated by the State Planning Commission of the central government directly
rather than, as in the case of a locally-controlled firm, being allocated to provincial governments
first.
68 In other words, at least in principle, FAW, as a firm, is subject to the same planning
authority and control of the central government as the Shanghai municipal government itself.
During the reform era, the function of material allocation by the central government has declined
markedly. What turns out to be important for cross-jurisdictional acquisitions, however, is the
organizational and coordination role of the central government.
In institutional terms, FAW and SAIC are two different firms, not in terms of the nature of
their ownership as both are SOEs, but in terms of the levels of government that exercise those
ownership rights. As pointed out previously, SAIC is a municipal-level firm and is subject
closely to the supervisory authority of the Shanghai government. One indication of this
difference between FAW and SAIC is the amount of state equity in these two firms.
Traditionally, state equity is roughly proportional to the amount of equity interests held by the
central government in a firm. In 1997, the state equity interests amounted to 89 percent of
FAW’s paid-in equity capital whereas they only amounted to 39 percent in the case of SAIC.
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This institutional difference means that an acquisition strategy is at least feasible for FAW
(although still difficult, as shown below) but it is inordinately costly for SAIC. FAW can rely on
the central government to coordinate communication and negotiation with different regional
governments. For SAIC, a “build” strategy is more feasible because all the coordination and
organization efforts take place within the municipal boundary of Shanghai. The difference in
their strategies is indeed very sharp.  One indication shows up in the ratio of spending on new
plant and equipment purchase to the capital stock of these two firms. Because FAW built up its
fixed assets via acquisitions, it spent modestly on new plant and equipment purchase, as a
proportion to its fixed asset stock. In contrast, SAIC had a much higher ratio. Between 1990 and
1994, during a period in which both firms expanded rapidly, the ratio for FAW was 0.16 whereas
it was 0.39 for SAIC.
69 Another indication is the geographic location of the affiliates of the two
firms. FAW is headquartered in Jilin province but fourteen out of its twenty affiliates—i.e.,
wholly-owned subsidiaries or firms in which FAW has a significant equity stake—are located
outside of Jilin province. In contrast, despite the fact that SAIC has a greater number of affiliates,
thirty-eight, not a single of its affiliates is located outside Shanghai. To be sure, on some
dimensions, FAW is a larger firm but the national scope of FAW’s operations and the regional
focus of SAIC are not solely a function of the size difference between the two firms. Table 3
compares FAW and SAIC on a number of dimensions. FAW is larger in terms of asset and
employment, but it is considerably smaller than SAIC as measured by sales and profits. The two
firms are comparable in terms of production volume. Another piece of corroborating evidence
that size difference did not determine the geographic scope of firms is the contrast between SAIC
and China General Automotive Industry Corporation (CGAIC). CGAIC was a much smaller firm
than SAIC. In 1997, it had 9.48 billion yuan in assets or about one fourth of SAIC and it
generated a sales revenue of 6.5 billion yuan, which was about one-sixth of SAIC. Yet ten out of
fourteen of CGAIC’s affiliates were located outside the province of the headquarters of the
firm.
70 The reason is that CGAIC, like FAW, is a central government firm and thus it faces less
constraints in its investment activities outside its province of its headquarters.
Table 3 about here.
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To control for depreciation allowances, we can also use net fixed assets. The result is the same. Purchasing
new plant and equipment as a share of the net fixed asset stock was 0.36 for FAW but 0.65 for SAIC.
70 Data are reported in (Ministry of Machinery Industry 1998).41
As a central-government firm, the negotiation costs for FAW to acquire assets cross-
jurisdictionally are relatively more manageable because of the facilitating role of the central
government. According to a survey, most of the “acquisition” deals were not financial
transactions. Instead, the assets were simply administratively assigned to FAW at zero costs. In
such deals, the coordinating role of the central government is critical. In one of its acquisition
deals, a vice premier of the State Council personally intervened to make it happen. Still, more
often than not, FAW had to rely on informal connections rather than just interventions from the
central government to facilitate its acquisition attempts. In two instances, the former governors of
Jilin province, who became governors of the home provinces to the target firms at the time of
acquisitions, made the arrangements that facilitated takeovers by FAW.
71
Administrative tax division rules have created obstacles to FAW’s acquisition efforts, as
indicated by the acquisitions it made in light-truck production. Today, FAW is the second largest
producer of light-duty trucks in China. FAW, which was built as a predominantly medium-duty
truck producer, rose to the top mainly through a number of acquisitions it made since the mid-
1980s but the particular travails of FAW’s acquisitions illustrate the often stringent constraints
on cross-jurisdictional asset acquisitions in the Chinese economy. In 1986, FAW began its light-
duty truck production not by a straightforward acquisition but by contractual alliances with two
light-duty truck producers. These two alliances eventually evolved into full acquisitions by FAW
in 1991 and this process is interesting in several aspects. First, both of the truck producers were
the so-called municipal enterprises, one under the Jilin city and the other under Changchun city.
Because of the administrative tax derivation rules, a full acquisition by FAW would reduce the
tax base of these two city governments and both agencies opposed such a move. The contractual
alliance was a compromise in order to preserve the original ownership ties with the two city
governments. Second, what is especially interesting about the institutional impediments in this
instance is that FAW and the two truck producers were located in the same province, Jilin, and
one even in the same city. This shows how powerful the institutional divisions are as even the
natural pulling influences of geographic proximity were offset.
Third, the contractual alliance was unwieldy and inefficient and was created purely to
deal with an institutional artifact such as the tax derivation rules rather than as a result of rational
business considerations. Because assets of the two truck producers still belonged to their
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respective city governments, FAW could inject product lines, technicians, and managers into
these two firms but it was unable to transfer production equipment and facilities from one firm to
another. Thus the larger gains from production integration remained untapped and the production
processes could not be optimized. FAW wanted the Jilin firm to assemble the one-ton trucks with
chassis supplied by the Changchun firm whereas the Changchun firm would produce two-ton
trucks with front body supplied by the Jilin firm. But FAW was prevented from integrating and
transferring assets and instead the two truck producers kept their own duplicate facilities in
chassis and front-body manufacturing equipment.
In the end, in 1991, FAW eventually took over these two truck producers but under
sharply different circumstances from the ones prevailing in 1986. Light-duty truck production
became congested and the two truck producers began to incur large losses. This changed the
calculus of the two shareholding city governments. Selling off these two firms became a way to
reduce liabilities. Still in one of the acquisitions, FAW had to create a subsidiary in the Jilin city
that was designated as a municipal enterprise for the sole purpose of paying income taxes to the
Jilin city government.
72
As the story of FAW’s acquisitions of the two truck producers show, social motivations
and functions play an important role in the acquisition activities in China. Because of this
emphasis on the social functions, more economically-oriented regional governments shun
acquisition as a strategy to integrate production. By default, a “build” strategy is often thought of
as facilitating economic objectives. This plausibly explains why SAIC has systematically favored
a “build” strategy. FAW, being a central firm, is more susceptible to social considerations of the
central government and it has been compelled to acquire loss-making operations in a number of
instances. A good example here is the acquisition by the FAW of Jinbei Shareholding
Corporation in Liaoning Province in 1995. Jinbei produced light passenger vans and FAW was
contemplating to move into this product segment. But the deal was far from ideal from the
perspective of FAW. Jinbei had been performing poorly. In 1994 even when the entire
automotive industry was expanding rapidly, Jinbei’s pre-tax profit to asset ratio was only 1.8
percent as compared to the industry average of 4.6 percent. Jinbei also had a lot of non-
production assets on its balance sheet, at 48.57 percent as a proportion of the total fixed assets.
73
Non-production assets refer to those assets that do not generate any cash flows and represent a
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firm’s investments in provision of social services, such as employee housing, canteens,
bathhouses, schools, and hospitals, etc. Jinbei’s high non-production asset ratio would impose
heavy burdens on FAW as the takeover of Jinbei called for a large injection of production assets
and financing its high levels of social services out of FAW’s operating income. But in the end,
the deal went ahead largely because the central government prevailed upon a reluctant FAW.
Economic fragmentation and FDI
In the previous sections, we have examined the processes and outcomes of economic
fragmentation in China. In this section, we turn to the FDI question and examine the relationships
between economic fragmentation on the one hand and FDI on the other. The claim I am making
is that economic fragmentation makes FDI more valuable to Chinese firms and regional
governments than otherwise would be the case. It is helpful to recall a startling fact that I
presented in Chapter 1 of this book: The tiny Macao held a larger investment position in China
than the powerful Guangdong province did in the rest of China. These are not just two intriguing
and innocuous economic facts; in fact they are intimately connected. That firms based in
Guangdong found it difficult to invest outside the province might have contributed to a greater
inflow of FDI from Macao.
Economic fragmentation increases the bargaining power of foreign firms because
domestic firms cannot bid for projects or assets cross-jurisdictionally whereas foreign firms
could. In effect, economic fragmentation makes China’s asset market less contestable than it
would ordinarily be. The mechanism is simple. Because there are no similar constraints on the
mobility of foreign capital, foreign firms are free to fund operations wherever there is a capital
shortage but domestic firms are constrained from doing the same. This means that in effect
foreign firms as a whole have many more projects to choose from than domestic firms and that,
for any given fundable project, foreign firms are essentially competing with other firms rather
than having to compete with domestic firms as suppliers of capital. The overall effect is that
some foreign firms have come to play a financing role that is often disproportionately large
relative to their financial, technological, and managerial prowess.
The example of CSI, outlined at the beginning of this chapter illustrates this dynamic
very well. CSI was founded by Oei Hong Leong, an Indonesian businessman with a reputation of44
a corporate raider in Asia and with a somewhat troubled business history in Singapore.
74 In 1991,
Oei bought a Hong Kong company called Ruby Holdings and renamed it CSI. Ruby Holdings
was listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange and was a medium-sized company primarily focused
on restaurants, garments and real estate. Oei himself had come primarily from a background of
asset trading and deals rather than any deep experience in industry and manufacturing. With the
founding of CSI, he began to focus on manufacturing concerns. In 1992, he acquired majority
controls of another listed company, Holian Investments, a manufacturer of household goods
which operated production in China.
75  Its Hong Kong-related businesses apparently generated
only 84 million dollars in 1992.
After Oei suffered a debacle in Singapore, a Singaporean journalist cautioned Oei to
learn from seasoned business people such as Li Ka-shing of Hong Kong and Liem Sioe Liong of
Indonesia. “[P]erhaps,” she wrote, “they know when to leave the big-stakes game to the big
boys.”
76 Apparently, Oei never learned the lesson. From a humble beginning, CSI was on an
acquisition binge in China between 1992 and 1994 and took over some 200 companies at a time
when Chinese economy was growing at 11 percent a year. CSI was poised to become a huge
business empire in China overnight with controlling equity stakes in numerous manufacturing
concerns ranging from tires, brewery, aluminum to machine tools. His acquisitions spanned the
entire country. The first break for CSI came in July 1992 when CSI bought controlling interests
in forty-one SOEs in Quanzhou city in Fujian province in one fell swoop and then in another
deal, in 1993, CSI took control of 101 factories in the northeastern city of Dalian in Liaoning
province. Between 1992 and 1994, CSI was on an acquisition binge and it took over some 200
companies in China in diverse businesses and a number of its affiliates emerged to be the largest
players in their lines of business overnight, from brewery, tires, chemicals, to machinery. In
1992, CSI acquired controlling stakes in two tire manufacturers, one in the city of Hangzhou and
the other in Shanxi province. Overnight, CSI became a dominant player in China’s tire business.
Its affiliate, China Tires Holding Limited, became the largest tire manufacturing group in China
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within one year of CSI’s investments. In 1993, China Tires accounted for 10 percent of tire
production in China. In July 1993, CSI listed China Tire Holding Limited (China Tires) on the
New York Stock Exchange. China Tires was incorporated in Bermuda and held controlling
interests in tire manufacturing firms in China. Its listing raised 97 million dollars net of expenses,
which richly rewarded CSI. It was reported in the press that CSI had invested 20 million dollars
in these tire concerns. Between 1993 and 1996, CSI used the IPO proceeds to finance additional
acquisitions of tire-manufacturing facilities as well as significantly upgrading its existing tire
production. Between 1993 and 1996, China Tires acquired controlling interests in four more
Chinese tire producers and two international tire companies (one based in California and one
based in British Virgin Islands).
Apart the suppression of funding opportunities available to domestic firms, there are
other subtler connections between economic fragmentation and FDI. The most important effect
of economic fragmentation is that it makes Chinese firms less competitive than they would be
otherwise. Less competitive Chinese firms increase the relative advantage of foreign firms and,
as consistently argued in this book, relative advantage of foreign firms is a good predictor of FDI.
In the following paragraphs, I will first present a number of hypotheses spelling out the
theoretical linkages between economic fragmentation and FDI inflows. The next two sections
present some corroborating evidence.
Institutional foundation hypotheses
There are several mechanisms whereby economic fragmentation can contribute to a
greater demand for FDI. One mechanism is straightforward. A fragmented market may make
Chinese firms less competitive than their economic potentials allow and to the extent that
weakness of domestic firms induces FDI (in the presence of large market potentials) FDI rises as
a response. Thus economic fragmentation affects Chinese competitiveness exactly in the same
way as a poor allocation of financial resources—by rendering Chinese firms uncompetitive
across the board and by raising the relative competitiveness of foreign firms in the process. The
prediction that FDI rises in this scenario is directly derived from our framework used throughout
this book that FDI is a function of relative advantages of foreign over domestic firms.
The above argument rests on a notion that a small home market contributes to firm
uncompetitiveness. The logic here needs to be spelled out more fully rather than being taken on
its face value. There are two issues. One is the linkage between home—as opposed to foreign—
market on firm competitiveness; the other is the linkage between the size of home market and46
firm competitiveness. On both questions, Michael Porter’s analysis of determinants of national
competitiveness is most helpful. According to Porter, home base of a firm plays a
disproportionate role in creating and shaping national competitiveness at the firm level. Home
base consists of both production factors as well as demand-side factors. A firm is more likely to
attain competitiveness—as measured against the best in the world—if it operates in an
environment with the right home base conditions. Between production factors and demand-side
factors, Porter stresses the demand-side factors as especially important.
77 Managers are more
likely to pay attention to buyer needs and characteristics nearby rather than to those far away.
They also understand home buyers better. There is “an intuitive grasp of buyers’ circumstances”
that cannot be achieved with foreign buyers. Without cultural complications, communication is
easier and free of misunderstanding between buyers and producers of the same country.
78
There are many demand-side factors in Porter’s analytical framework. Of particular
relevance to our analysis here are the size and the quality of home market demand. The effect
associated with the size of home market demand on firm competitiveness is not obvious.
Countries often thought of as having a small market, such as Switzerland, Sweden, Korea and
even Japan, boast of many of the most preeminent firms in the world. Indeed, precisely because
of the small size of their markets, firms in these countries were pressured to export and to excel
on the global market. “Home market size proves to play a complex role in national advantage,” as
Porter remarks (Porter 1990, p. 92-93), “and other aspects of home demand are as or more
important.”
With that caveat in mind, a large home market still entails a number of advantages,
especially in the Chinese context in which a compression of home market demand does not
readily translate into export pressures.
79 For one thing, as Porter points out, a large market
confers “static efficiency” on firms operating in those industries characterized by economies of
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78 Apart from production factors and demand-side conditions, Porter also deals with the
importance of related industries and firm strategy. These four aspects reinforce each other to constitute what
he calls “national diamond,” a system that determines the competitiveness of nations. See (Porter 1990).
79 The lack of a compensating export outlet is important for our analysis. After all, the logic that a
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but that an export market often entails very exacting conditions on firms operating in that market.47
scale. One consequence associated with economic fragmentation in China is the persistence of
high average production cost. For example, even for the largest car producer in China, SVW, its
production cost was several multiples of import prices of comparable foreign cars. In 1991, the
unit price for the Santana model was 173,000 yuan; a similar import only cost about 40,000 yuan
before tariffs. Quality of home market demand, as much as or more than the quantity of home
market demand, has a strong bearing on national competitiveness in Porter’s analysis.
Sophisticated and demanding buyers prod firms to innovate and to invest in continuous product
improvements. They also help firms identify the needs of most advanced buyers. In Porter’s
analysis, much of the Japanese success, in products ranging from air-conditioners, camera, and
pens, derived from the tough demands placed on Japanese firms by Japanese buyers. Diversity of
demand conditions also fosters competitive advantages. According to Porter, commercial air-
conditioning industry is advanced in the United States because the country encompasses
practically all the conceivable climatic and industry conditions.
80
Porter’s analysis of Japanese success takes as given a fundamental condition necessary
for national competitiveness—the existence of vibrant domestic competition. This is the fourth
corner of Porter’s diamond framework and it is among the most important factors in his
conception of what makes a nation competitive.
81 China fails this basic test, by a long shot.
Artificially carving a single market into several smaller segments lowers the quality of home
market demand. The effect of trade protectionism and capital controls at the regional level is that
firms operate as near monopolies in their highly regionalized markets and in pockets of high
profits. The degree of rivalry is sharply reduced. Deprived of choices, Chinese buyers are captive
in those product segments targeted by regional governments. For example, it would be hard for
taxi companies in Shanghai to staff their fleets with anything other than Santana and it would be
hard for SVW to source its components from firms other than the affiliates of SAIC. These are
not demanding market conditions that compel firms to be innovative and to make huge
investments in product improvement. The effect on firm competitiveness is vividly—and
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somewhat hilariously—illustrated by Li Lanqing, China’s vice premier, recounting his
experience of a visit to a truck factory:
82
What is really interesting is my visit to a factory in Chongqing,
producing a certain “Liberation” truck. But the name of the truck was not
Liberation; it was, instead, “Forever Forward.” I commented that you got a good
name, indicating your willingness to march forward bravely. He [the manager]
replied that in fact it was a literal name. The truck did not have a reverse gear; it
could only move forward.
Economic fragmentation also diminishes a natural and huge advantage China has over
many other developing countries: The diverse demand conditions created by its vast geographic
expanse. China is comparable to the United States in physical size and it encompasses extremely
diverse geographic, climatic, social and economic conditions. In addition, the rural/urban
contrast is sharp. These would be propitious conditions to foster firm competitiveness. A firm
that meets the heterogeneous market conditions and demands at home is better prepared to
compete globally. Economic fragmentation, in essence, decomposes a single market with many
heterogeneous attributes into smaller and individually homogenous segments. Thus a factor—its
natural diversity—that ought to foster national competitiveness is greatly diminished. It is no
accident that twenty years of rapid economic growth has not led to the emergence of a single
globally competitive Chinese firm.
So far, our analysis has focused on the impact of economic fragmentation on the nature
of demand-side factors in curtailing Chinese competitiveness (and by extension, raising Chinese
demand for FDI). There are also supply-side factors at work and the supply-side factors increase
demand for FDI because creating and sustaining a fragmented economic structure is an
economically costly proposition. Firms may have to invest more or more firms invest in capital-
intensive industries than they would otherwise. Greater demand for capital translates into a larger
demand for FDI.
The kind of regional integration strategy SAIC undertook basically means that China
foregoes the economic gains from the existing regional patterns of comparative advantages.
Guizhou province, as our account makes clear, had already developed a comparative advantage
in automotive components but SAIC’s systematic effort to create a supplier base in Shanghai in
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essence amounts to an effort to shift such a comparative advantage to Shanghai. But such an
effort costs money on the one hand and results in wastes and duplication on the other. To
reinvent the wheel in Shanghai requires additional capital spending. Because SAIC chose a
“build” strategy rather than acquiring the Guizhou facility, Guizhou’s existing facilities were
simply rendered useless.
Second, fragmentation in an industry—such as automotive industry—characterized by
scale economies is costly, as already mentioned. In an industry with large scale economies, the
average costs fall as the output volume increases. This means, all else being equal, a fragmented
industry structure incurs a higher average cost per unit of output as compared with a concentrated
industry structure. Not only are production costs a falling function of production volume,
investment costs also fall as the incremental output range gets large. A Chinese study shows that
investment costs for adding facilities fall as output capacity increases. For example, the
investments would increase by 40 percent when output capacity doubled from 100,000 units to
200,000 units [Wu, 1997 #1709].
Third, it is well-known that an import substitution strategy favors capital-intensive
industries. Cite evidence on capital intensity. Regional import substitution strategies duplicate
capital-intensive industries and amplify the capital bias by many folds. The logic is
straightforward. Under a single national import substitution strategy, it is still feasible for
different regions of the same country to produce along their own comparative advantages even
though the entire country as a whole may not do so. Regional import substitution strategies in
effect mean departures from the principle of comparative advantages across the board and are
likely to worsen the capital bias even more.
Regional import substitution strategy and FDI
Regional integration implies foregoing a sourcing option based on the existing patterns
of comparative advantages of Chinese provinces. Doing so is not cheap, especially in an industry
with scale economies, such as automotive industry. Building a completely new facility is more
expensive than expanding an existing facility because a substantial portion of the facility is
“volume-invariant.” One needs to complete an entire assembly line whether it assembles one
vehicle or 10,000 vehicles a year. When SAIC decided to build a muffler production facility of
its own when Guizhou Honghu already operated on a substantial scale, more capital expenditures
were required than if SAIC had continued to source from Guizhou Honghu and had significantly
increased the size of its orders.50
The added resource requirements have to be met somehow. For SAIC, one way was to
mobilize domestic resources in order to invest aggressively in the development of a components
sector. The costs were mainly borne by the Chinese consumers who were charged an exorbitant
price for Santana, a car model that was obsolete in Europe as of the late 1970s. As mentioned
before, the Shanghai government levied a “localization tax” between 1988 and 1994 for the
specific purpose of building a components sector in Shanghai. SAIC, rather than Volkswagen,
was the main beneficiary of the supernormal profits on Santana and of the localization tax. The
joint venture contract with Volkswagen gave SAIC the exclusive marketing right over Santana
and thus SAIC, through its sales division, reaped most of the financial gains. In 1994, the factory
gate price for a stripped-down Santana was 106,000 yuan; the retail price (exclusive of various
purchasing fees) came to 168,000 yuan. The ratio of retail to factory-gate prices, at 1.58, was by
far the highest among all the passenger vehicle producers in China.
83 SAIC then plowed back this
enormous amount of profits into its components sector.
The other way was to actively solicit help from MNCs. Herein lies the connection
between regional import substitution strategy and FDI demand. A regional import substitution
strategy creates a fund shortage that otherwise would not exist (or it made an existing fund
shortage more severe than it needed to be). To make up any shortfalls in funds, MNCs are
courted and are made more valuable. An FDI demand of this sort is driven by an institutional
imperative, less by the actual business needs of sourcing price-competitive and quality
components.
It is important to be specific about precisely why building a supplier base in Shanghai
would lead to a higher FDI demand. In our example about SAIC changing its sourcing of the
muffler systems, neither Guizhou Honghu nor the replacement firm in Shanghai were FIEs and
thus FDI was not involved. However, our hypothesis does not require there be a direct linkage
between replacing imports from foreign provinces and FDI. The reason is that money is both a
fungible and finite resource. The amount of money that was spent to create a muffler firm in
Shanghai could not be used to do other things. For example, the money was not available to
invest in a project to produce a component that was not available anywhere in China. (Doing so
was necessary because the government imposed localization schedules on Chinese automotive
firms.) In essence, SAIC needed to replace imports from foreign provinces and from foreign
countries at the same time. To do that, SAIC would have to raise additional capital elsewhere. To
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relate this reasoning to the measure we have been using as an indicator of FDI preferences,
foreign equity proportion of FIEs, the money SAIC spent on replacing its existing suppliers could
not be used to finance SAIC’s equity stakes in its joint ventures with MNCs and its equity stakes
would be lower as a result.
Throughout this book, we have used foreign equity proportion of FIEs as a measure of
Chinese FDI preferences. The larger the foreign equity proportion are, the stronger Chinese FDI
preferences are said to be. Although this measure is not perfect, short of alternative measures,
this is probably the best proxy that we can find. Here we use foreign equity proportion as an
indicator of the extent of SAIC’s demand for FDI. A logical inference of our analysis is that
SAIC should exhibit a greater demand for FDI as compared with other automotive firms with a
less aggressive regional import substitution stance. Compared to those firms, SAIC should have
conceded more corporate controls over its affiliates to MNCs.
Table 4 presents information on the various characteristics of FIE affiliates within four
major automotive business groups, SAIC, BAIC, Tianjin Automotive Industry Corporation
(TAIC), and Guangzhou Automotive Industry Corporation (GAIC). Until recently, these four
groups were the dominant players in China’s car production. (In the late 1990s, other car
producers came on line such as FAW’s joint venture with Volkswagen to produce Audi and Jetta
series and a joint venture between Dongfeng Motor Corporation and Citreon to produce a Fukang
series.) TAIC was a specialist in a mini car, Charade (Xiali in Chinese), which was widely
popular with households and smaller taxi companies. TAIC had a joint venture with Toyota for
its engine production but the car assembly division was controlled by TAIC itself. GAIC created
a joint ventures in car production in the same year as SAIC, in 1985. The joint venture,
Guangzhou Peugeot Corporation (GPC), was with Peugeot of France, and at its height, in 1993,
churned out 16,765 mid-size cars. Plagued by a small volume and chronic losses, Peugeot
withdrew from the joint venture in February 1997. (Honda took over the Peugeot facility in 1998
to assemble its Accord model.)
These four firms are comparable on a number of critical dimensions. All four were
municipal firms under direct controls by the city governments. They were all primarily car and
single-vehicular producers. Thus comparing them rather than with multi-vehicular firms such as
FAW and Dongfeng Motor Corporation implicitly imposes a control on differences in
technology, nature of market demand and production processes. All four of them relied on MNCs
for design, engineering expertise, and financial resources for their vehicle assembly operations
(although, as will be shown later, the degree of their reliance differed). One important difference52
lies in the extent they pursued a regional import substitution strategy. SAIC carried out a
methodical and systematic strategy to backward integrate into components production. TAIC
adopted a similar strategy, albeit with less fanfare. In contrast, both BAIC and GAIC were
“laissez-faire” in their approach and did not actively venture into components production.
Table 4 about there.
The contrast in their integration strategies can be shown in a number of ways. The
components production under SAIC and TAIC increased their importance between 1992 and
1997 substantially. As shown in Table 4, the share of components production doubled in the case
of TAIC, from 14.3 percent to 30.5 percent, whereas it increased more than 50 percent in the
case of SAIC (from 17.8 percent to 27 percent). The increase in components production is
across-the-board, as measured by employment and net fixed assets (not shown in the table). By
those measures, it is clear that BAIC and GAIC did not stress the development of components
production nearly as much. For BAIC, components production in fact declined, from 21 percent
in 1992 to 17.4 percent in 1997. GAIC witnessed a small increase in the components production
but since it started from a de novo position in 1992, the increase, by 5.6 percent, is almost
inconsequential. SAIC and TAIC also invested heavily in components production. In 1997, 81
percent of new fixed asset investments made by SAIC went to the components firms; for TAIC,
the figure was 63.7 percent. For BAIC, it was only 4.5 percent and it was 10 percent for GAIC.
Table 4 gives the simple arithmetic averages of foreign equity proportion in percentage
terms. There is some, although not overwhelming, evidence, that higher a movement into
components production is associated with greater foreign equity stakes. FIEs within TAIC have,
by far, the highest foreign equity ratios, at 53.3 percent. BAIC has the lowest ratio, at 44.8
percent. GAIC has the second highest ratio, at 49.6 percent, but its ratio is not substantially
higher than that of SAIC. In addition, the foreign equity proportion of GAIC FIEs is somewhat
inflated by including two wholly-owned FIEs. Wholly-owned FIEs are rare in this industry
because of the governmental restrictions. The fact that GAIC had two of them must be attributed
to the status of Guangdong province as a special economic zone. When these two wholly-owned
FIEs are dropped from the calculation, the foreign equity proportion come down to 47.1 percent.
At this level, SAIC and GAIC are quite comparable in terms of the extent of foreign ownership
controls.
84
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Before we draw the conclusion that a deep integration strategy on the part of SAIC and
TAIC resulted in greater foreign equity holdings, a number of alternative hypotheses must be
considered. First, we must consider the role of FDI regulatory environment in influencing the
extent of foreign ownership controls among these four firms. Some regions are more liberal than
others in their policies toward foreign equity controls. To the extent that FDI regulations played a
role, it ought to reinforce our conclusion. Guangdong is, by far, the most liberal province in its
FDI policies and Shanghai is considered to be the most stringent. Yet, as shown above, the
differences between the two provinces are not substantial. If one is to exclude the two wholly-
owned FIEs from Guangzhou data, the foreign equity proportion of GAIC FIEs is almost
identical to that prevailing within SAIC. This is a startling result: The two provinces on the
opposite spectrum of FDI policy restrictions end up with roughly the same levels of foreign
equity holdings.
MNCs seem to have been more active in Shanghai. Compared to Beijing at least, MNCs
had gone to Shanghai earlier. Before 1990, only three joint ventures were established in Beijing
as compared with six in Shanghai. Even before the dramatic rise of FDI inflows into China, FIEs
played a far more important role in automotive industry as sources of employment, output and
financing in Shanghai. In 1992, joint ventures accounted for 2.36 percent of industrial output
value, 2.66 percent in employment and 2.17 percent of net fixed assets in Beijing. But in
Shanghai, the shares were much higher. FIEs in 1992 accounted for 4.77 percent of industrial
output value, 13.94 percent of employment, and 14.55 percent of net fixed assets.
85  The larger
role of FDI in Shanghai’s automotive sector was not a result of greater receptivity of Shanghai to
FDI during the 1980s. Foreign investors in Shanghai often complained about long delays in the
approval process and complicated bureaucratic procedures, a perception, in the words of a study
on this issue, that “resulted in an increasing distance between the speed of foreign capital
utilization and growth rate between Shanghai and its brother provinces.”
86 Nor was the larger
                                                                                                                                                             
BAIC had the opposite combination. If this is the case, then the simple arithmetic averages would be
misleading.  However, this is not the case. For 1998, we have paid-in capital data on a consolidated basis
and these data show that TAIC and SAIC had bigger foreign equity holdings than BAIC. (Data for GAIC
are not available.) For TAIC, the foreign equity holdings of its affiliates came to 39.8 percent; for SAIC, it
was 31.7 percent. For BAIC, it was only 20.5 percent. Data are from (State Bureau of Machinery Industry
1999).
85 Calculated from (Ministry of Machinery Industry 1993).
86 See (Luo Gengmo 1994) .54
role of FIEs in Shanghai’s automotive industry a result of larger FDI inflows into Shanghai in the
1980s. In 1988, FDI inflows into Shanghai amounted to about 72 percent of what Beijing got.
Shanghai was not a magnet for foreign investments until the central government granted SEZ
status to Shanghai in 1991. By 1992, Shanghai quickly caught up with Beijing and the FDI
inflows into Shanghai amounted to 226 percent of Beijing’s FDI inflows in the same year, a gap
that has grown to 256 percent by 1997.
Another hypothesis is that the attractiveness of these four business groups to MNCs
varied and more attractive firms could obtain more FDI at a given level of Chinese control.
However, just as the last hypothesis, this hypothesis should predict SAIC to be less controlled by
MNCs. SAIC was considered a far more desirable JV partner to MNCs than either BAIC or
GAIC. SAIC operated at higher profit margins and enjoyed sustained and dedicated support from
the Shanghai government. It built up a huge war chest of capital from the exorbitant prices it
charged to Santana buyers. It dominated China’s car market. Its management was viewed by
many as competent and modern in its outlook. In two instances at least, SAIC used its
considerable financial prowess to buy back stakes from foreign shareholders. One was Shanghai
Yanfeng, a joint venture with Ford Motor Corporation to produce interior trimming parts. The
joint venture was established in 1994, with Ford holding 51 percent of the equity. SAIC later
increased its holding to 50 percent. Compared to SAIC, BAIC was in a far weaker bargaining
position vis-à-vis MNCs and it had to cede ownership controls to MNCs over time. BAIC
initially held 69 percent of the equity stake in BJC but in 1990, it reduced its stake to 62 percent
and then to 58 percent in 1994. Yet our data in Table 4, which incorporated these two equity
adjustments, still show greater foreign equity holdings on the part of SAIC.
87
A slightly different hypothesis from the above states that firms with greater bargaining
power should be able to maintain greater ownership controls over the future cash flows. SAIC
and TAIC, because of their greater profitability and superior performance, should be able to
negotiate better equity terms than BAIC and GAIC. The greater foreign ownership shares of the
FIEs of SAIC and TAIC are, thus, inconsistent with this version of the bargaining perspective.
Another test of the bargaining perspective is to assess the changes of foreign equity proportion
over time. As is well-known, compared to the 1980s, China in the 1990s became far more
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percent to 47.5 percent.55
attractive to MNCs and the major automotive MNCs were knocking each other over in order to
get into China. Chinese firms, thus, in the 1990s should be in a stronger position to negotiate
with MNCs simply because the supply of FDI was much greater.
Our data again contradict this expectation. For both SAIC and BAIC, the foreign equity
proportions of those FIEs established in the 1990s are larger than the ones for the entire sample
while for TAIC and GAIC they are about the same.
88 Thus SAIC and BAIC seem to have lost
bargaining power vis-à-vis MNCs. Of course, this pattern might have resulted from a confluence
of several developments. In the 1990s, the FDI regulatory environment became more liberal and
thus an increase in the foreign equity holdings is not surprising. What may be a bit unexpected is
that foreign equity holdings should have increased to the same extent between SAIC and BAIC.
As pointed out before, during the course of the 1990s, the paths of SAIC and BAIC diverged
sharply. SAIC rose from behind to the top of the Chinese automotive industry whereas BAIC
atrophied over time. One would expect to see BAIC grow more desperate for foreign capital than
SAIC when in reality SAIC exhibited as strong—or stronger—a preference for FDI.
Another hypothesis is that foreign equity proportion should vary inversely with the
profitability of Chinese investing firms. More profitable Chinese firms would need less of
foreign capital and less profitable ones would need more. The profitability differences among
these four Chinese business groups reinforce, rather than weaken, our conclusion. SAIC and
TAIC were by far the more profitable firms as compared to BAIC and GAIC. Their returns on
assets were 27.2 percent for SAIC and 29.8 percent for TAIC in 1992. The same measures for
BAIC and GAIC were only 15.1 percent and 10.4 percent. One would predict, all else being
equal, SAIC and TAIC to be more “choosy” and less willing to make equity concessions,
precisely the opposite outcome from the actual observations.
Finally, one can argue that the types of foreign investors differed among these four
business groups, which might have led to different patterns of foreign equity holdings. For
example, although SAIC had more bargaining power than other Chinese firms, they might have
negotiated with the most preeminent automotive firms of the world. Indeed foreign investors who
had teamed up with SAIC read like a who-is-who list of the largest automotive MNCs of the
world. GM, Ford, TRW, Volkswagen, Delphi, and Hughes Electronics have all maintained
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investment positions in Shanghai. The preponderance of the premier MNCs in Shanghai is
indicated by the much larger size of investments in Shanghai. Table 4 shows that the average
paid-in capital for FIEs under SAIC amounted to 40 million dollars, in comparison to much
smaller amounts for other firms.
While the difference in investor types may have contributed to the varying foreign equity
holdings between SAIC and other firms, this explanation alone cannot account for the difference
between TAIC on the one hand and BAIC. The size of paid-in capital of TAIC affiliates is
smaller than that of BAIC (20.6 million dollars compared to 23.9 million dollars), but the size of
foreign holdings is much larger (53.3 percent compared to 44.8 percent). The composition of
foreign investors in Tianjin is not noticeably different from that in Beijing. To the extent that
there is a difference, Japanese investors were more active in Tianjin but this difference should
have resulted in a lower, not higher,  foreign equity holding in Tianjin. By reputation, Japanese
investors are more willing to accept minority shareholder status as compared to American
investors.
Economic fragmentation and FDI fragmentation
In the previous section, we have shown that firms such as SAIC and TAIC which
pursued an aggressive integration strategy would be more eager to source FDI. They could court
foreign investors by easing the terms for MNC entry and by allowing MNCs to claim a greater
proportion of cash flows of future automotive industry growth in China. FDI rose because for a
given unit of future business opportunity in China the investment costs were lowered. This is one
avenue whereby economic fragmentation may have increased China’s FDI inflows. Another
avenue is through a greater dispersion of FDI-financed facilities. As the example of SAIC shows,
to be able to supply to SAIC, an MNC needed to form an equity alliance with SAIC. (It is also
possible that the same dynamics worked at TAIC as well.) The result is that an MNC might have
to invest in three facilities in order to supply to three vehicle producers even in situations in
which one facility might have been sufficient to supply to all three. If there are scale economies
involved and if the assets are somewhat indivisible (i.e., the entire facility needs to be
constructed whether 100 or 100,000 units are produced), the investment costs would be higher
than in the absence of economic fragmentation. The money which would finance operating
budget and volume expansions ended up financing capacity creation instead.
There are a number of examples of MNCs having to invest in several facilities in order to
supply to different vendors. One example concerns seat belts. Until 1997, SVW bought all of its57
seat belts from a supplier in city of Nanjing, in Jiangsu province. The Nanjing supplier was a
joint venture with Autoliv, Inc. of Sweden, which is one of the largest producers of seat belt and
air bag systems in Europe. Volkswagen, SVW’s German shareholder, is a large customer of
Autoliv and Autoliv often followed Volkswagen in its investments abroad. The Brazilian
subsidiary of Autoliv, for example, supplies seat belt and air bag systems to Volkswagen. Its
Chinese joint venture was formed in 1990 with the intention to supply seat belts to SVW. The
joint venture began with a total capitalization of 3.5 million dollars. Autoliv Group and its
Chinese partner, a military firm which had previously produced parachute gears, each held 50
percent in the venture. For a while, the JV was doing very well. By 1996, it was the second
largest producer of seat belts in the country, accounting for 22 percent of the market. The returns
were good. In 1995 its gross profit margin was 23.7 percent with an output volume of 430,000
units.
In January 1997, a subsidiary of SAIC, Shanghai Clutch Factory, formed a joint venture
with TRW—Shanghai TRW Automotive Safety Systems Corporation—to produce seat belts. As
soon as the in-house production began, immediately SVW switched its seat belt supplier from
Nanjing-Autoliv to Shanghai TRW. In 1997, Shanghai TRW churned out 239,800 units of
seatbelts (from zero in 1996), overtaking Nanjing-Autoliv as the second largest seatbelt
manufacturer in the country overnight. It accounted for 60 percent of the seatbelts sourced by
SVW in that year. The effect on Nanjing-Autoliv was immediate and devastating. Its output
volume plunged from 266,769 units to 132,356 units, creating a great financial distress for the
firm. By 1996, the Nanjing-Autoliv had already built capacity sufficient for one million seatbelts
and thus Shanghai-TRW created excessive capacity in Nanjing. Switching of suppliers shifted
profits from Nanjing to Shanghai. The pre-tax profits per employee at Shanghai TRW was 3,283
yuan in 1997, as compared with only 911 yuan for the Nanjing-Autoliv.
89 In an interview, a TRW
manager explained that forming a joint venture with SAIC is the only way to win supply
contracts with SVW. The hard edge of SAIC is illustrated by the fact that Shanghai TRW,
apparently, is the only joint venture in the world in which TRW has agreed to a less than
majority-controlled arrangement.
ZF Friedrichshafen A.G. had a similar experience. ZF, the leading German parts
supplier, maintained eight production sites in China. In 1994, ZF signed an agreement with FAW
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to produce hydraulic steering gears with the intention to supply to the affiliates of Volkswagen in
China. The operation ran into difficulties apparently because SAIC refused to source from a
facility outside Shanghai and outside SAIC. In 1996, ZF had no choice but to enter into an
agreement directly with SAIC to establish a separate joint venture to produce steering systems
for Santana. SAIC held 49 percent stake in this joint venture.
90
Statistical evidence: FIEs in machinery industry
In the previous section, we showed that appetites for FDI differed among Chinese
automotive firms in part because of the different extent they pursued an integration strategy.
SAIC embodied such a strategy. It had systematically replaced components imports not only
from foreign countries but also from foreign provinces. SAIC relied more heavily on MNCs than
BAIC and GAIC because SAIC needed more capital to build its own supplier base rather than
continuing with the existing supplier relationships with components firms in other provinces.
The descriptive findings reported in Table 4 are, at best, suggestive rather than
conclusive. The descriptive analysis is limited to four observation units and there may be many
other differences among them which a case study is unable to control for perfectly. The other
issue has to do with the effect of asset fragmentation on FDI. Our hypothesis rests heavily on a
distinction between a “build” strategy and an acquisition strategy. Our premise is that a “build”
strategy is more expensive than an acquisition strategy in the presence of huge idle capacity and
that SAIC and TAIC demanded more FDI in part because they could not acquire assets located in
other provinces. The high level of FDI demand on the part of SAIC and TAIC was directly due to
their integration strategy in the context of asset fragmentation. But because all four of our firms
were locally-controlled firms and they faced similar political constraints in investing outside
their provinces, the linkage between the asset fragmentation and FDI demand cannot be directly
demonstrated. All we could do was to demonstrate a linkage between pursuing an integration
strategy and FDI demand, not a linkage between cross-regional acquisition constraints and FDI
demand. A legitimate counterfactual hypothesis is that even if SAIC and TAIC desired to
integrate their production, it might not be sufficient to trigger FDI demand. Suppose an
acquisition option were available, SAIC and TAIC might have acquired their suppliers as a way
to build up their supply capabilities. This would be a cheaper alternative since a substantial over-
capacity had been built up in this industry.
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In this section, we remedy this shortcoming in two ways. First, we rely on a statistical
analysis of a moderately large sample size to demonstrate linkages between asset fragmentation
and FDI preferences. The data are drawn from China’s machinery industry and the dataset
consists of 62 units of observations. Although the sample size is only moderately large, it still
enables us to control for many firm-level characteristics that may bear on FDI preferences better
than even a carefully-designed case study. Second, we attempt to demonstrate the effect of asset
fragmentation more directly by comparing FDI preferences of two types of firms. These two
types of firms face different constraints on their ability to acquire assets in foreign provinces. By
comparing their FDI preferences (while controlling for their other attributes), we are able to
demonstrate the effect of asset fragmentation more directly.
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, there are two broad types of Chinese firms
depending on the levels of their administrative affiliations. The first consists of central
government firms, i.e., those firms whose control and income rights rest with the central
government. Central government firms are freer to invest and to acquire assets cross-regionally
because they are not constrained by regional authorities. Also, as our study on FAW shows, it is
politically and administratively easier for Beijing to negotiate with a province about asset
transfers than it is for a province to negotiate with another province. Thus central government
firms are under less pressures to pursue a regional import substitution strategy or are more able
to acquire assets across political jurisdictions than locally-controlled firms. This is demonstrated
in our examination of FAW earlier in this chapter. FAW operated production throughout the
country and it took over many geographically-dispersed facilities in the 1980s and 1990s. Its
acquisition attempts were not easy and straightforward, but the important point is that it was at
least feasible for FAW to do it. FAW, thus, is said to face less asset fragmentation constraints
than firms such as SAIC, BAIC or TAIC. In this section, we present findings from a statistical
analysis of the effects on FDI preferences that are associated with the varying constraints of asset
segmentation.
Our data are organized at the level of holding firms, all in the machinery industry. The
regional holding firms were previously regional bureaus of machinery industry under MMI.
During the reform era the regional bureaus became more autonomous and independent from
MMI in Beijing and they reported directly to the authorities in their regions.
91 Since the mid-
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1990s, as a part of the SOE ownership reform program, many of these regional bureaus were
converted into holding firms with enhanced power over internal management matters such as
rights over asset disposals and transfers within each holding firm. In addition, several
independent business units were carved out from a mono-bureaucratic structure. For example, in
Tianjin, in 1997, there were four separate holding firms all operating in the machinery industry
while in the 1980s all the businesses had been consolidated under one bureau of machinery
industry in Tianjin.
The entire machinery industry consists of sixty-two holding firms. Forty-nine are
regional; thirteen are central. Central holding firms are much larger than regional holding firms.
Table 5 breaks down these sixty two firms by their administrative subordination and presents
their various characteristics. Measured in asset and employment terms, central holding firms are
about ten times the regional holding firms. On average, an affiliate of a central holding firm has
about 1.5 billion yuan in assets and employs over 7,700 persons. In contrast, a regional affiliate
only has 143 million yuan in assets and employs 720 persons.
There are numerous affiliates under these holding firms. Although the statistical source
does not give a definition of an affiliate, from the profiles of a number of affiliates of SAIC and
BAIC, it can be ascertained that an affiliate is a firm that a holding firm either owns wholly or in
which it has a partial stake. The partial equity stakes include both majority and minority stakes.
Many of these affiliates were factories under the charge of line bureaus of machinery industry or
MMI. During the central planning era, they were simply administrative appendices to China’s
vast industrial bureaucracy. During the reform era, these affiliates became more independent and
acquired legal entities separate from their supervisory agencies. They could, for example,
negotiate FDI contracts with foreign firms (subject to supervision and approvals of the holding
firms) and enter into production and debt contracts with other firms. SVW, for example, is one of
the thirty-eight affiliates under SAIC, which is a regional holding firm. Regional holding firms
operate numerous affiliates. On average, each regional holding firm operates some 177 affiliates
while the central holding firm runs only thirty-eight of them.
Table 5 about here.
Our analysis aims to determine if FDI preferences systematically differ between central
and regional holding firms. Our hypothesis is that a central holding firm, all else being equal, has
a lower FDI demand because it is able to acquire assets across different regions and has a lesser
need to resort to a “build” strategy to integrate its production. A typical central holding firm
faces less asset fragmentation constraints as compared to a typical regional holding firm. As61
elsewhere in this book, we measure FDI preferences in terms of foreign equity proportion of FIE
affiliates. Foreign equity proportions are the ratios of foreign paid-in capital to the total paid-in
capital of a firm. In our dataset, foreign equity proportions represent the cumulative foreign
equity claims in the FIE affiliates of the holding firms, not the foreign equity claims of the
holding firms. A Chinese investor in a joint venture can be an affiliate of a holding firm or it can
be the holding firm itself. Holding firms themselves are not FIEs and they are either owned 100
percent by the state or majority-controlled by the state. FDI contracts were entered into
individually and separately with the partnering affiliates or with the holding firms themselves.
The holding firms played a critical role in negotiations and set the guideline for FDI negotiations.
Asset fragmentation constraints are operationalized by a dummy variable, central holding
firm (CHF). CHF is assigned a value of one when it is a central holding firm and a value of zero
in the case of a regional holding firm. Because central holding firms face less asset fragmentation
constraints, they should demand less FDI and therefore CHF is expected to be negatively
associated with foreign equity proportions. Apart from asset fragmentation constraints, many
other factors bear on the equity splits between Chinese and foreign investing firms. For example,
foreign control of overseas market channels and marketing expertise is often said to lead to
greater foreign equity controls. In order to ascertain the effect of FDI preference, it is necessary
to control for the effect of other theoretically-relevant determinants. In our book, these other
determining factors mainly serve as controls and we call them control variables. The purpose is
to equalize, statistically, the variance along these control variables across different firms in order
to isolate the effect of our substantive variable, which is FDI preference in our book.
We offer two models conceptualizing how foreign equity proportions are determined.
(The appendix to this chapter offers a more detailed explanation.) The first model is very simple:
It assumes that foreign equity proportions are a function of the level of FDI inflows. The larger
FDI inflows are, the larger foreign equity proportions are. The aim here is to see if asset
fragmentation constraints exert any additional influences on foreign equity proportions once the
effect of FDI levels is fully taken into account. The idea behind this conceptualization is that the
realized FDI flows already incorporated all the theoretically-relevant determinants of foreign
equity proportion. Since we only have a partial or imprecise knowledge of what those
determinants are we opt to use a proxy variable that incorporates the effect of all the
determinants combined. Because our dependent variable refers to foreign equity proportion at the62
level of affiliates, we use the average FDI per affiliate in our analysis (abbreviated as FDIPA in
Table 6).
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Our other model spells out some of the theoretically-relevant control variables explicitly
and includes them in lieu of FDI levels in the statistical analysis. The appendix provides more
details explaining both the rationale behind our specification as well as the operationalization of
the variables. Suffice it to say that our specification is guided in part by the industrial
organization (IO) conceptions of FDI determination. However, there are a number of differences
with the IO theory that should be explicitly noted. One difference is that the standard approach
typically examines factors influencing distribution of FDI across different industries whereas our
study focuses on the distribution of equity shares across different firms within the same industry.
But machinery industry is very broad and encompasses many products with different
technological characteristics. The approach may make sense if, for example, firms specialize in
particular industry segments. In addition, the IO conceptualization has been extended to the firm-
level data by other researchers who are interested in studying bargaining dynamics between
MNCs and host governments and firms. Such an extension has proven to be highly fruitful in
guiding the basic research design.
93 The bigger difference has to do with the analytical purpose
of our inquiry. As I carefully set out from the very beginning of this book, my interest is to study
Chinese demand for FDI, not so much foreign supply of FDI. In a real world, obviously, demand
factors intersect with supply factors to produce the actual outcome. Thus in order to assess the
effect of those demand factors accurately, it is necessary to control for those factors that affect
the supply side. These IO variables mainly serve this purpose in our analysis. Third, it should be
stressed that the IO variables in our study serve as control variables. Unlike most of the studies
in the IO literature, these variables themselves are not the main subject of our inquiry. Our
analytical interest is to understand how asset fragmentation constraints may or may not affect
FDI preferences.
There are four control variables based roughly on an IO perspective on FDI. They are:
foreign marketing control (FMC), the average asset size per affiliate (AAPA), R&D expenditures
of holding firms (R&DE), and the proportion of the largest affiliates (PLA). These four variables
are intended to capture the gist of the IO perspective that FDI is a function of market power and
specialized know-how on the part of MNCs. However, our own specification differs from the
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standard approach. All our data are based on the IO characteristics of Chinese firms, rather than
the IO characteristics of foreign investing firms. The standard approach is to use the IO
characteristics of foreign investing firms as those supply factors affecting FDI but because of the
data limitations, this is infeasible. It is reasonable to expect that the IO characteristics of the
Chinese firms may correlate strongly with the IO characteristics of foreign firms. Take industry
concentration as an example. While institutional factors, as shown in this chapter, affect the
extent of such IO characteristics as industry concentration within an industry, they do not change
the rank order of industry concentration across industries. Chinese automotive industry is less
concentrated than it is elsewhere but it is one of the most concentrated industries in China.
FMC is operationalized by the export shares of production of a holding firm. The more
export a firm produces, the more foreign marketing control an MNC exercises. More FMC is one
of the advantages held by MNCs and should lead to greater foreign equity controls. R&DE is
measured as the ratios of R&D expenditures to sales in a holding firm. MNCs excel in the R&D
intensive activities and thus they should enjoy advantages in technologically-intensive areas
when they negotiate with Chinese firms. R&DE should be associated positively with foreign
equity proportion. AAPA is the average asset size per affiliate within a holding firm. Large asset
size is typically associated with market power and thus confers more advantages on investing
MNCs. It should be positively correlated with foreign equity proportion.
94 Finally, the presence
of very large firms is used to measure the degree of entry barriers in a particular industry or
industry segment. MNCs, according to the IO theory, enjoy advantages in industries with entry
barriers.
The appendix discusses other renditions of the statistical methods and presents results
from alternative operalizations of both dependent and independent variables. The appendix also
discusses the problems that arise when the control variables themselves are caused by our
dependent variable. Thus the causal connection may go from foreign equity controls to some of
our control variables, rather than the other way around. (This is called an endogeneity problem.)
While this problem casts into doubt interpretations of some of the control variables, it is
important to point out and stress that there is no question as to the causal direction of our
substantive variable, CHF. The purpose of including the control variables is to impose a ceteris
paribus condition despite the fact that the underlying causal mechanism of these control
variables may be misspecfied.
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Table 6 presents results from our simple model in which the only control variable is the
FDI level. Five versions of this model are run, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
technique.
95 The dependent variable is the foreign equity ratio given by the ratio of foreign equity
to the total paid-in equity capital of a holding firm. In the first version, only CHF and FDIPA are
included and in other versions, additional control variables are added one by one to the analysis.
In all versions, the level of FDI, i.e., FDIPA, is positively associated with FER at a statistically
significant level, providing evidence for the unsurprising proposition that more FDI inflows do
contribute to greater equity controls by the MNCs. However, FDIPA is not the only influence on
FER; in Table 6 the dummy variable for central holding firms, CHF, is consistently negative and
statistically significant. The coefficient ranges from –0.044 to –0.051. This means a typical
central holding firm has a smaller FER compared to a typical regional holding firm in the order
of 0.044 to 0.051 after the level of their FDI inflows is equalized. To put it another way, the same
amount of FDI inflows generates a smaller degree of foreign ownership among central holding
firms as compared to regional holding firms. This is prima facie that regional holding firms made
larger equity concessions to MNCs than did central holding firms.
Table 6 about here.
To be sure there may be other differences between a central and regional holding firm
other than their FDI preference that may lead to this outcome. For example,  in automotive
industry, regional holding firms such as SAIC and GAIC are all located in the coastal provinces
whereas central holding firms such as Dongfeng Motor Corporation are in the interior province
of Hubei. FAW is located in Jilin province, hardly a magnet for FDI. This locational difference
may have an effect on FER because policies and regulations on FDI tend to be more liberal in
coastal provinces than in interior provinces. Another possibility is that the central government
protects its own firms from foreign encroachment more than it does for regional firms. The
central government has a greater equity stake in central holding firms than in regional holding
firms and it may restrict foreign ownership in order not to dilute its own equity shares.
96 While
this is germane to the FDI preference question, the difference in the FDI preference, however,
arises from a different mechanism than asset fragmentation. Finally, Chinese firms—and SOEs
in particular—carry a heavy load of social liability such as pension payments to the retired
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workers and provision of social welfare functions. Social liability may deter FDI, which should
be captured by the FDIPA variable, but it may also weaken the bargaining position of the
Chinese firms. To the extent that central holding firms may have a lower level of social liability
than regional holding firms, they may gain bargaining power vis-à-vis MNCs, not because they
face less asset fragmentation constraints.
97
In Table 6, versions two to four of Model One incorporate these three variables into the
regression analysis. Coastal effect (COAST) is a dummy variable with a value of one for holding
firms located in coastal provinces and a value of zero for those in the interior provinces. The
state equity ratio (SER) is the ratio of state equity stake to the Chinese portion of the total paid-in
equity capital of a holding firm.
98 Social liability ratio (SLR) is calculated as the ratio of non-
production fixed assets of a holding firm to its total fixed assets. Non-production fixed assets are
assets that appear on a firm’s balance sheet but do not generate any cash flows. Examples of such
assets include employee housing, communal bath and dinning facilities, schools, and health care
facilities, etc. If these three variables better explain the seemingly lower FDI demand on the part
of central holding firms, including them in the regression analysis should either weaken or make
CHF effect go away. However, this did not happen. In Table 6, CHF continues to be statistically
significant and the sign remains negative even after all three other control variables are added.
This is an indication that the FDI-suppressant effect of the CHF is not explained by the
alternative theories why central holding firms may enjoy a bargaining edge over regional holding
firms vis-à-vis MNCs.
Table 7 presents an alternative model of determinants of foreign equity proportion, using
explicit measures of those factors that purportedly affect FDI flows. Thus Model Two differs
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from Model One by substituting FDIPA with four variables that IO literature views as important
influences on FDI flows and, in the extensions of the IO perspective to firm-level studies, as
important influences on bargaining power of MNCs. Two of these four variables, FMC and
AAPA, are statistically significant and acquire a positive sign consistent with the IO perspective
on FDI. The other two variables, however, fail to attain statistical significance and one of them,
PLF, produces a negative coefficient, contrary to the prediction of the IO theory. Our substantive
variable, CHF, however remains statistically significant and retains the negative sign across the
four versions of Model Two, thus providing further proof that our conception of FDI preference
is robust to the various specifications about the determinants of foreign equity proportion.
Table 7 here.
Conclusion
Economic fragmentation has never been an intention on the part of China’s central policy
makers. Speaking in 1984, Deng Xiaoping declared, “Invigoration of the domestic economy also
means opening the domestic economy. There are, in fact, two open policies: open to the outside
world and open to the inside.” The Chinese policy makers have been consistent in stressing both
external and internal openings and throughout the 1980s the central government issued
instructions to local authorities to “unclog the channels of circulation,” to “smash blockades.” In
1991, Hu Ping, the then Minister of Commerce, reiterated the importance of the twin openings to
the world and internal markets.
99 The reality, as carefully laid out in this chapter, has sharply
diverged from the original policy intentions. One straightforward measure is that while foreign
trade—i.e., export plus import—as a share of GDP has risen during the reform era, inter-
provincial trade as a share of provincial GDP has shrunk and in many provinces it has shrunk
dramatically. The economic fragmentation has not only occurred on the product market but it has
been accentuated on the asset market. Immobility of goods is reinforced by the immobility of
capital.
In the history of China’s planned economy, economic centralization has been a sporadic
response to what has been viewed as excessive decentralization. In other words, decentralization
has always been the reigning principle of China’s economic organization, not centralization. But
China’s decentralization is of an overwhelmingly administrative kind, i.e., the central
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government has delegated many economic responsibilities—including running, operating and
collecting taxes from firms—to lower-level authorities. The administrative decentralization ought
to be distinguished from economic decentralization—defined here as moving economic
responsibilities out of governmental sphere and into the hands of private hands. That China has
chosen administrative over economic decentralization is no accident; it is a function of the fact
that the government has steadfastly and stubbornly refused to adopt a privatization stance.
Administrative decentralization, thus, is an efficiency-enhancing device given that true economic
decentralization is precluded as a politically viable solution to many of the problems in a socialist
economy.
Economic fragmentation holds important implications for the roles and functions of FDI.
Economic fragmentation costs capital and those regional governments deeply in pursuit of an
import substitution strategy needed to import capital somewhere. Asset fragmentation, however,
essentially means that cross-regional capital mobility is low for domestic firms and FDI rises to
fulfil this unsatisfied need. This is the basic logic behind our hypothesis that economic
fragmentation raises China’s demand for FDI. Or put it another way, the higher demand for FDI
prompts regional governments to pay a higher price for it—by ceding more controls over assets
than otherwise would be the case. This chapter provides considerable amount of evidence
documenting the degree of economic fragmentation, the extent of import substitution strategies at
the regional level, and the effect on FDI demand on the part of Chinese firms.
Throughout this book, we have argued that a high portion of FDI inflows into China is
induced by the way Chinese economic and financial institutions are designed. Fragmentation-
induced FDI has as a firm institutional grounding as our two other institutional sources of FDI—
insolvency of the state sector and liquidity constraints of private firms. The reason is that
economic fragmentation is not just a function of configuring and reconfiguring resources and
power between central government and regional governments but is fundamentally rooted in the
state ownership. To that extent, we argue that fragmentation-induced FDI is ultimately rooted in
state ownership—the institutional foundation of China’s half-reformed economy.68
Appendix
Sources of data
The main source of data is (State Bureau of Machinery Industry 1998a). This is the most
comprehensive and most detailed collection of industry and firm data among all the available
sources. Each year firms in China are required to fill out detailed informational forms to be
submitted to their supervisory agencies. The data contained in (State Bureau of Machinery
Industry 1998a) were aggregated by the State Bureau of Machinery Industry from all the
provinces and all the central government firms under its jurisdiction. The source contains
detailed balance sheet and income statement data as well as physical data on output, units of
equipment, employment, etc. The data are also much more disaggregated than the usual statistical
sources such as Chinese Statistical Yearbook or Chinese Industry Yearbook. This level of
disaggregation permits a researcher to undertake the kind of detailed statistical analysis as
undertaken here.
 Definitions of variables
Our dependent variable is the proportion of equity stakes held by foreign companies and
it is calculated by taking the ratio of foreign equity to total paid-in equity capital of a firm. The
equity stakes refer to registered equity capital, i.e., the amount of equity capital a firm has when
it registers itself with the State Bureau of Commerce and Industry. It is otherwise known as paid-
in equity capital and the equity splits between Chinese and foreign firms are at the time of
registration. Subsequently, a firm may elect to change its equity split, which requires approval
from the Chinese government. The reason that we use foreign equity proportion at the time of
registration is that it best reflects the bargaining positions of Chinese and foreign firms at the
time they negotiate the joint venture formation. Just to make sure, I have also run all the
regression analyses in this chapter on the actual foreign equity proportion at the time the data
were collected. The results are not different from using paid-in equity data.
Our substantive variable is a dummy variable with the value of one for central holding
firms and the value of zero for regional holding firms. It is abbreviated as CHF in the text. The
control variable in Model One is FDI per affiliate (FDIPA), which is simply the amount of
foreign equity capital in a holding firm divided by the number of its affiliates. In all the69
regression runs, FDIPA is transformed by taking logs. This is done to remove the non-linearity in
this variable.
Four control variables appear in Model Two. Foreign marketing control (FMC) is
denoted by the proportion of the industrial output value that is exported. R&D expenditure
(R&DE) is the ratio of R&D expenditure to sales of a holding firm. Average asset per affiliate
(AAPA) refers to the asset of a holding firm divided by the number of affiliates within a holding
firm. Like FDIPA, this variable is log transformed to remove the non-linearity in it. Proportion of
largest firms (PLF) is the proportion of affiliates with a  production-related fixed asset in excess
of 50 million yuan within a holding firm. The statistical source gives the number of affiliates for
seven categories broken down by the size of the production-related fixed asset: 1) below 1
million yuan, 2) between 1 and 5 million yuan, 3) between 5 and 10 million yuan, 4) between 10
million to 30 million yuan, 5) between 30 million and 50 million yuan, 6) between 50 and 100
million yuan and 7) above 100 million yuan. The largest firm here is defined as one in excess of
50 million yuan in production-related fixe assets.
Other control variables are COAST, state equity ratio (SER), and social liability ratio
(SLR). COAST is a dummy variable with the value of one for all the holding firms located in
coastal provinces and the value of zero for those located in the non-coastal provinces. SER is
given by dividing the state equity by the Chinese portion of the paid-in equity capital of a holding
firm. The Chinese portion of the paid-in equity capital is derived by subtracting the foreign
equity capital from the total paid-in equity capital. SLR is given by dividing the non-production
fixed assets of a holding firm by its total fixed assets. Both fixed asset figures are given as their
original cost values.
Table 8 presents descriptive statistics on the main variables used in the analysis.
Table 8 about here.
Model specifications
Model Two is guided by the theoretical accounts in the economics literature on FDI
determinants. By far, the dominant account of the cross-industry FDI distribution is the industrial
organization (IO) explanation. The IO reasoning hinges on the notion that FDI, fundamentally,
reflects the ability of profit-maximizing MNCs to overcome market imperfections. The starting70
point of the IO reasoning is that foreign firms incur costs that domestic firms do not.
100 These
costs range from the intrinsic difficulties of managing cross-border operations to the costs of
gathering information and developing expertise about foreign markets, political, social and legal
environments, etc. Political uncertainty also abounds in investing overseas. Much of these costs
is large, fixed and up-front. To offset these extra costs, a foreign firm must possess internal,
ownership-specific advantages over its domestic rival firms. These advantages take the form of
R&D capabilities, managerial know-how, organizational skills, marketing expertise, and
economies of scale, etc. Further, the idea that these advantages must be firm-specific is central to
the IO perspective. These advantages are available to the MNCs, but not to others due to the
structural impediments. The clearest examples here would be patent protection and brand name
that yield rents to their holders.
The spirit of the IO explanation dictates that the inter-industry distribution of FDI be
modeled as a function of the following characteristics of an industry: the degree of product
differentiation, level of competition, scale economies, and research and development (R&D)
intensity. MNCs are hypothesized to be more prevalent in those industries that are characterized
by a significant degree of product differentiation, high concentration ratios, scale economies and
deep R&D expenditures due to their superior market power over their domestic rivals. In general,
IO-motivated research on inter-industry distribution of FDI in more developed economies such as
Canada and United Kingdoms has received more empirical validation than similar research on
FDI in developing economies.
101
As noted in the text, our control variables suffer from what is known as an “endogeneity
problem,” i.e., while our model assumes that the causal direction runs from these control
variables to the FER it may very well be the case that FER is a cause of our control variables. For
example, one can plausibly argue that higher values of FER should lead to higher values of
FDIPA, not the other way around. MNCs, for example, may demand controlling equity stakes
and short of controlling equity stakes FDI may not materialize.
                                                     
100 The pioneering work in this field is (Hymer 1976 ). For a good summary of this large body of
literature, see(Caves 1996) and (Lizondo 1995).  For a good summary with specific references to
developing countries, see (Lall 1978) and (De Mello 1997).
101 For a sample of empirical work on the inter-industry determination of FDI distribution, see
(Caves 1974), (Orr 1974) and (Meredith 1984), which in general provided support for the IO postulates.  In
contrast, (Aswicahyono and Hill 1995) only found mixed evidence for the IO theory.71
The nature of the inquiry makes it very difficult to completely rid of the endogeneity
problem. Our primary concern, however, is whether the statistical significance and the sign of
our substantive variable, CHF, are somewhat affected by this endogeneity problem. On an a
priori basis, there is no reason that CHF should be affected one way or the other (and CHF itself,
for sure, does not suffer from endogeneity problem). Just to make sure, I have relied on
alternative dependent variables which may attenuate, although not remove, the endogeneity
problem. One way is to lag the independent variables so that the values of independent and
dependent variables are not contemporaneous. We have the data on FER for 1998 and thus I have
regressed the FER for 1998 on the same independent variables in Models One and Two. The
results are not different. Of course, this does not really deal with the endogeneity problem since
the 1998 values of the independent variables are surely highly correlated with the 1997 values of
the independent variables. Instead, I used the ratio of the 1998 foreign equity capital to the 1997
foreign equity capital as the dependent variable. CHF is negative in both Models One and Two
but it is only significant in Model One (at -0.548 with a standard error of 0.239). Thus there is
some evidence that CHF deters FDI growth from 1997 to 1998. This does not really get to the
heart of our question, which is about foreign ownership control. The dependent variable thus
formulated is about the growth of FDI from 1997 to 1998.
Our data structure is cross-sectional and in a cross-sectional data structure one of the
assumptions for OLS analysis may be violated and this has to do with the assumption that the
distribution of the dependent variable has the same spread. To remedy this problem, statistical
researchers use a technique called Generalized Least Squares (GLS). I have used GLS technique
for all our specifications and the sign and the statistical significance of CHF remain unaffected.72
Table 1 Concentration Ratios of the Automotive Industry: Four-Country Comparison (%)











































































Sources: Data on Brazil, Japan, and Korea are calculated from World Motor Vehicle Data and
Ward’s Automotive Yearbook,  various issues. Data on China are calculated from China
Automotive Yearbook, various issues.73

































Notes: * Assets = Net fixed assets + current assets.
**: Gross margins = Pre-tax profits/sales revenues.74
Table 3 FAW and SAIC compared, 1997
FAW SAIC
Subordinate to: MMI in Beijing Shanghai city
Assets 59.82 billion yuan 36.19 billion yuan
Sales 34.11 billion yuan 40.39 billion yuan
Profits 570.4 million yuan 5.54 billion yuan
Employment 173,043 persons 61,672 persons
Vehicle output 268,868 units 232,074 units
Number of affiliates 20 38
Number of affiliates located outside home provinces 14 0
Note: MMI stands for Ministry of Machinery Industry. Affiliate is defined as a firm in
which FAW or SAIC has a substantial equity interest (usually above 50 percent).
Source: (Ministry of Machinery Industry 1998).75
Table 4 Four automotive business groups compared: Integration strategy, performance and FIE characteristics, various years
Components production as shares of :
(%)
b
Various performance measures FIE characteristics Firms
a



















share of total paid-in
capital, (%)
Year 1992 1997 1997 1992 1998 1996 1996 1983-1997 1983-1997 1983-
1997
1990s
SAIC 17.8 27.0 81.1 27.2 14.9 90.45 200,222 29 40.9 47.4 48.3
TAIC 14.3 30.5 63.7 29.8 1.43 93.29 88,000 25 20.6 53.3 53.1












 Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation. TAIC: Tianjin Automotive Industry Corporation. BAIC: Beijing Automotive Industry Corporation. GAIC:
Guangdong Automotive Industry Corporation.
b: Components include engines, but not chassis.
c: Data on GAIC are not available. The data presented in the table refer to Guangzhou city.76
d: Returns on assets are given by: Pre-tax profits divided by the sum of net fixed assets and current assets. Pre-tax profits are used because tax rates often differ among
firms.
e: Localization ratios are measured in quantity rather than in value terms. The figures cover passenger car vehicles only. The passenger cars being measured are: Santana
(SAIC), Charade TJ7100 (TAIC), Cherokee BJ2021 (BAIC), and Peugeot (GAIC).
f: Output volume refers to passenger cars only.
g: Figures in the bracket do not include two wholly-owned FIEs.
Sources: Information on FIEs is from (Zhang Xiaoyu 1998). Localization, output and profitability data are from (Ministry of Machinery Industry 1993) and (Ministry of
Machinery Industry 1997a).77
































Source: Based on (State Bureau of Machinery Industry 1998a).78
Table 6 Ordinary least squares regression analysis of foreign equity proportion in
the machinery industry: Model 1
Dependent variable: Foreign equity ratio (FER=foreign equity divided by the total paid-in capital)
Substantive
variable:



















































F-statistic 37.85* 27.68* 20.88* 17.1*
Number of
observation
62 62 62 62
Adjusted R
2 0.547 0.568 0.566 0.569
Note:
*: Significant at 0.05.
**: Significant at 0.10.
Variable definitions:
1)  Central holding firm (CHF): CHF is a dummy variable with one for central holding firms and
zero for regional holding firms.
2)   FDI per affiliate (FDIPA): FDIPA is given by dividing foreign equity capital of a holding
firm by the number of affiliates within that holding firm. The logged value of FDIPA is used
in the statistical analysis.
3)   Coastal effect (COAST): COAST is a dummy variable with the value of one for all the
holding firms located in coastal provinces and the value of zero for those located in the non-
coastal provinces.
4)  State equity ratio (SER): SER is given by dividing the state equity by the Chinese paid-in
equity capital of a holding firm. The Chinese portion of the paid-in equity capital is derived by
subtracting the foreign equity capital from the total paid-in equity capital.
5)  Social liability ratio (SLR): SLR is given by dividing the non-production fixed assets of a
holding firm by its total fixed assets. Both fixed asset figures are given as their  original cost
values.79
Table 7 OLS regression analysis of foreign equity proportion in the machinery
industry: Model 2
Dependent variable: Foreign equity ratio (FER=foreign equity divided by the total paid-in capital)
Substantive
variable:

















































































F-statistic 2.94* 3.43** 4.16* 4.3
Number of
observation
62 62 62 62
Adjusted R
2 0.137 0.195 0.266 0.30
Note:
*: Significant at 0.05.
**: significant at 0.10.
Variable definitions:
1)  Central holding firm (CHF): CHF is a dummy variable with one for central holding firms and
zero for regional holding firms.
2)  FDI per affiliate (FDIPA): FDIPA is given by dividing foreign equity capital of a holding firm
by the number of affiliates within that holding firm. The logged value of FDIPA is used in the
statistical analysis.
3)  Foreign marketing control (FMC): FMC is denoted by the proportion of exported industrial
output value to the total industrial output value of a holding firm.
4)  R&D expenditure (R&DE): R&DE is the ratio of R&D expenditure to the sales revenue of a
holding firm.
5)  Average asset per affiliate (AAPA): AAPA is the asset of a holding firm divided by the
number of its affiliates. In the regression analysis, the logged value of this variable is
estimated.
6)  Proportion of largest firms (PLF): PLF is the proportion of affiliates with a  production-related
fixed asset in excess of 50 million yuan within a holding firm. The statistical source gives the
number of affiliates for seven categories broken down by the size of the production-related
fixed asset: 1) below 1 million yuan, 2) between 1 and 5 million yuan, 3) between 5 and 1080
million yuan, 4) between 10 million to 30 million yuan, 5) between 30 million and 50 million
yuan, 6) between 50 and 100 million yuan and 7) above 100 million yuan. The largest firm
here is defined as one in excess of 50 million yuan in production-related fixe assets.
6)   Coastal effect (COAST): COAST is a dummy variable with the value of one for all the
holding firms located in coastal provinces and the value of zero for those located in the non-
coastal provinces.
7)  State equity ratio (SER): SER is given by dividing the state equity by the Chinese paid-in
equity capital of a holding firm. The Chinese portion of the paid-in equity capital is derived by
subtracting the foreign equity capital from the total paid-in equity capital.
8)  Social liability ratio (SLR): SLR is given by dividing the non-production fixed assets of a
holding firm by its total fixed assets. Both fixed asset figures are given as their  original cost
values.81













62 0.119 0.123 0 0.48
FDI per affiliate
(FDIPA)
62 4.54 2.67 0 9.15
Foreign marketing
control (FMC)
62 0.093 0.107 0 0.703
R&D expenditure
(R&DE)
62 0.022 0.027 0.0026 0.195
Average asset per
affiliate (AAPA)
62 9.66 1.31 7.498 13.05
Proportion of largest
firms (PLF)
62 0.307 0.283 0 182
Bibliography
Altshuler, Alan, Martin Anderson, et al. (1986). The Future of the Automobile. Cambridge, The
MIT Press.
Aswicahyono, H.H. and Hal Hill (1995). “Determinants of Foreign Ownership in Ldc
Manufacturing: An Indonesian Case Study.” Journal of International Business Studies
26(1): 139-158.
Baranson, Jack (1969). Automotive Industries in Developing Countries. Washington, DC,
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
Bauer, T  (1978  ). “Investment Cycles in Planned Economies .” Acta Oeconomica  21 (3): 243-
260 .
Beijing Haitehua Machinery and Electric Technology Development Corporation (1994). Guojia
Qiche Gongye Zhengce Xinbian [New Selections of the State's Industrial Policy
Documents]. Beijing, Beijing Haitehua Machinery and Electric Technology
Development Corporation.
Brandenburger, Adam M.  and Barry J. Nalebuff (1997). Co-Optetion. New York, Doubleday.
Caves, Richard E. (1974). “Causes of Direct Investment: Foreign Firms' Shares in Canadian and
United Kingdom Manufacturing Industries.” Review of Economics & Statistics 56(3):
279-293.
Caves, Richard E. (1996). Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
De Mello, Jr., Luiz R. (1997). “Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries and Growth:
A Selective Survey.” Journal of Development Studies 34(1): 1-34.
Donnithorne, Audrey  (1981 ). China's Economic System . London , George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.
Ghemawat, Pankaj (2000). Economic Evidence on the Globalization of Markets. Boston,
Harvard Business School Publishing.
Gomes-Casseres, Benjamin (1990). Firm Ownership Preferences and Host Government
Restrictions: An Integrated Approach. Journal of International Business Studies: 1-22.
Grosfeld, Irena  (1989 ). Disequilibrium Models of Investment  . Models of Disequilibrium and
Shortage in Centrally Planned Economies . Christopher Charemza Davis, Wojciech W.
New York , Chapman and Hall : 361-74 .
Guo Wanqing (1992). “You Qiutong Zouxiang Qiuyi [from Similarities to Differentiation].”
Jingji Yanjiu [Economic Research](12): 12-18.
Harrison, Mark  (1985  ). “Investment Mobilization and Capacity Completion in the Chinese and
Soviet Economies .” Economics of Planning  19 (2 ): 56-75 .
Harwit, Eric  (1995 ). China's Automobile Industry . Armonk, NY , M.E. Sharpe .
Hayek, Friedrich A.  (1974 ). The Price System as a Mechanism for Using Knowledge  .
Comparative Economic Systems . Morris    Bornstein. Homewood, IL , Richard D. Irwin,
Inc. : 22-33 .
He Jianzhang and Wang Jiye (1984). Zhongguo Jihua Guanli Wenti [on Chinese Planning].
Beijing, Shehui Kexueyuan chubanshe.
Huang, Yasheng (1996). Inflation and Investment Controls in China: The Political Economy of
Central-Local Relations During the Reform Era. New York, Cambridge University Press.
Huang, Yasheng  (1994  ). “Information, Bureaucracy and Economic Reforms in China and in the
Former Soviet Union  .” World Politics  47 (1 ): 102-134 .
Huang, Yasheng and Eric Thun (1999). Shanghai Volkswagen. Boston, Harvard Business School
Publishing.
Hymer, Stephen H.  (1976 ). The International Operations of National Firms . Cambridge , MIT .
Institute of Industrial Economy (1998). Zhongguo Gongye Fazhan Baogao 1998
[Development of Chinese Industry 1998]. Beijing, Jingji guangli chubanshe.83
Kornai, Janos  (1980 ). The Economics of Shortage . Amsterdam , North-Holland .
Kornai, Janos  (1992 ). The Socialist System . Princeton , Princeton University Press .
Krobin, Stephen J. (1987). Testing the Bargaining Hypothesis in the Manufacturing Sector in
Developing Countries. International Organization. 41: 609-638.
Lall, Sanjaya (1978). Transnationals, Domestic Enterprises, and Industrial Structure in Host
Ldcs: A Survey. Oxford Economic Papers. 30: 217-248.
Lardy, Nicholas R.  (1978 ). Economic Growth and Distribution in China . Cambridge ,
Cambridge University Press .
Lee, Han Shih (1992). Oei Hong Leong Making Waves in Hong Kong. Business Times.
Singapore: 5.
Lieberthal, Kenneth and Michel Oksenberg (1988). Policy Making in China: Leaders, Structures
and Processes. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Lim, Soon Neo (1994). China Strategic's Profit Surges to 138 Pc to Hk$ 153 M. Business Times.
Lindbeck, Assar  (1971 ). The Political Economy of the New Left . New York , Harper & Row .
Lizondo, J. Saul (1995). Foreign Direct Investment. Readings in International Business: A
Decision Approach. Robert Z. Aliber and Reid W. Click. Cambridge, MIT Press: 85-112.
Luo Gengmo (1994). Shige Zhuanti Tiaocha Yanjiu [Investigative Research on Ten Issue Areas].
Dalian, Tongbei Caijing Daxue Chubanshe.
McCallum, John (1995). National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns.
American Economic Review. 85: 615-23.
Meredith, Lindsay (1984). “U.S. Multinational Investments in Canadian Manufacturing
Industries.” Review of Economics & Statistics 66(1): 111-119.
Ministry of Machinery Industry (1991). Zhongguo Qiche Gongye Nianjian 1991 [China
Automotive Statistical Yearbook 1991]. Beijing, Zhongguo qiche gongye zong gongci.
Ministry of Machinery Industry (1993). Zhongguo Qiche Gongye Nianjian 1993 [Chinese
Automotive Industry Yearbook 1993]. Beijing, Ministry of Machinery Industry.
Ministry of Machinery Industry (1995). Zhongguo Qiche Gongye Nianjian 1995  [China
Automotive Statistical Yearbook 1995]. Beijing, Zhongguo Qiche Jishu Yanjiu
Zhongxin.
Ministry of Machinery Industry (1996). Qiche Gongye Guihua Cankao Ziliao 1996 [Reference
Materials for Automotive Industry Planning 1996]. Beijing, Chinese Research Center for
Automotive Technology.
Ministry of Machinery Industry (1997a). Qiche Gongye Guihua Cankao Ziliao 1997 [Reference
Materials for Automotive Industry Planning 1997]. Beijing, Zhongguo Qiche Jishu
Yanjiu Zhongxin.
Ministry of Machinery Industry (1997b). Zhongguo Qiche Gongye Nianjian 1997 [China
Automotive Industry Yearbook 1997]. Beijing, Ministry of Machinery Industry.
Ministry of Machinery Industry (1998). Zhongguo Qiche Gongye Nianjian 1998 [China
Automotive Statistical Yearbook 1998]. Beijing.
Ministry of Machinery Industry (1999). Zhongguo Qiche Gongye Nianjian 1999 [China
Automotive Statistical Yearbook 1999]. Beijing, Zhongguo Qiche Jishu Yanjiu
Zhongxin.
Office of Third Industrial Census (1997). The Data of the Third National Industrial Census of the
People's Republic of China in 1995. Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe.
Ong, Catherine (1992). Will Oei Hong Leong Ever Shake Off Wheeler-Dealer Image? Business
Times. Singapore: 3.
Orr, Dale (1974). “The Determinants of Entry: A Study of the Canadian Manufacturing
Industries.” Review of Economics & Statistics 56(1): 58-66.
Porter, Michael E. (1990). The Competitive Advantage of Nations. New York, The Free Press.84
Pratten, Clifford F. (1971). Economies of Scale in Manufacturing Industry. Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press.
Pryor, F. (1972). “An International Comparison of Concentration Ratios.” Review of Economics
and Statistics 54: 130-140.
Qian, Yingyi  and Chenggang Xu (1993). “The M-Form Hierarchy and China's Economic
Reform.” European Economic Review 37: 541-548.
Rhys, D.G. (1972). The Motor Industry: An Economic Survey. London, Butterworths.
Sachs, Jeffrey D. and Andrew Warner (1995). “Economic Reform and the Process of Global
Integration.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity(1): 1-95.
Schuman, Michael and Valerie Reitman (1997). Full Speed Ahead. Wall Street Journal: A1,
A12.
Shen Yifeng and He Yinqi (1998). Qiye Binggou Fenxi [Analysis of Enterprise Mergers and
Acquisitions]. Beijing, Zhongguo Duiwai Jingji Maoyi Chubanshe.
Sheng, Hong (1999). The Latest M&a Cases in China. Beijing, China Light Industry Press.
Solinger, Dorothy J. (1999). Contesting Citizenship in Urban China : Peasant Migrants, the State,
and the Logic of the Market. Berkeley, University of California Press.
State Bureau of Machinery Industry (1998a). 1997 Nian Jijie Gongye Zonghe Nianbao [Annual
Report on the Machinery Industry 1997]. Beijing, Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo guojia
jijie gongye jue.
State Bureau of Machinery Industry (1998b). Zhongguo Qiche Gongye Nianjian 1998 [China
Automotive Statistical Yearbook 1998]. Tianjin, Zhongguo Qiche Jishu Yanjiu
Zhongxin.
State Bureau of Machinery Industry (1999). 1998 Nian Jijie Gongye Zonghe Nianbao [Annual
Report on the Machinery Industry 1998]. Beijing, Guojia jijie gongye jue.
State Council and State Planning Commission (1990). Zhongguo Gongye Xianzhuang [the
Current State of Chinese Industry]. Beijing, Renmin chubanshe.
State Statistical Bureau (1997). Market Statistical Yearbook of China. Beijing, Zhongguo tongji
chubanshe.
State Statistical Bureau (1999). Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 1999 [China Statistical Yearbook
1999]. Beijing, Zhongguo tongji chubanshe.
Unirule Economic Research Institute (1997). Zhongguo Binggou Jingdian [Cases on Mergers and
Acquisitions in China]. Shanghai, Xueling Chubanshe.
Upton, David and Diane Long (1996). Shanghai Volkswagen. Boston, Harvard Business School.
Wafstyl, Stefan (1996). Zf Investment in China to Rise. Financial Times.
Wang, Shaoguang and Angang Hu (1999). The Political Economy of Uneven Development: The
Case of China. Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe.
Watson, Andrew Findlay, Christopher Du Yintang  (1989  ). “Who Won the "Wool War"?: A
Case Study of Rural Product Marketing in China .” The China Quarterly (118 ): 213-241.
Wedeman, Andrew (2000). Bambo Walls and Brick Ramparts: Rent Seeking, Local
Protectionism, and Marketization in China, 1984-1993.
White, Lawrence J. (1971). The Automobile Industry since 1945. Cambridge, Harvard University
Press.
Wong, Christine P.W.  (1985 ). Material Allocations and Decentralization: Impact of the Local
Sector on Industrial Reform  . The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Mao China.
Elizabeth Wong Perry, Christine   . Cambridge , Harvard University Press : 253-278 .
Wong, Christine P.W.  (1991  ). “Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: The
Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China .” The China Quarterly (128 ):
691-715 .85
Wong, Christine P.W.  (1992  ). “Fiscal Reform and Local Industrialization: The Problematic
Sequencing of Reform in Post-Mao China .” Modern China  18 : 197-227 .
Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, et al. (1995). Fiscal Management and Economic
Reform in the People's Republic of China. Hong Kong, Oxford University Press.
World Bank (1990). China: Macroeconomic Stability and Industrial Growth under Decentralized
Socialism. Washington, DC, The World Bank.
World Bank (1994). Internal Market Development and Regulations. Washington, DC, World
Bank.
World Bank (2000). World Development Report 1999/2000. Washington, DC, The World Bank.
Wu Deming (1987). Guojia Yusuan Guanli Tizhi Gailun [an Outline of the Government Budget
Management System]. Beijing, Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe.
Xu, Xiaonian and Yan Wang (1997). Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and
Corporate Performance. Washington, DC, World Bank.
Young, Alwyn (1997). “The Razor's Edge: Distortions and Incremental Reform in the People's
Republic of China.” Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Zhang Xiaoyu (1998). Zhongguo Qiche Gongye Waishang Touzi Qiye Huibian Ji Touzi Zhinan
[Foreign-Invested Enterprises in Chinese Automotive Industry and Investment Guide].
Beijing, Ministry of Machinery Industry.
Zhao, Mingshan (1997). “Woguo Moxie Gongye Chanpin Shengchan Nengli Xiangdui Guosheng
Yuanyin Fenxi [Analysis of Reasons for Relative Overcapacity of Production in Certain
Products].” Jingji Guanli [Economic Management](220): 12-15.
Zheng Lixin (1994). Zhongguo Zhizhu Chanye Zhenxin Fanglie [Strategies of Developing
China's Pillar Industries]. Beijing, Zhongguo jihua chubanshe.THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers
The entire Working Paper Series is available at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
CURRENT AS OF 5/10/01
Publication Authors Date
No. 374 Economic Fragmentation and FDI in China Yasheng Huang May 2001
No. 373 Earnings Disparities in the Czech Republic: Evidence of the
Past Decade and Cross-National Comparison
Jiri Vecernik May 2001
No. 372 Economic Reform, Democracy and Growth During Post-
Communist Transition
Jan Fidrmuc Mar. 2001
No. 371 Do Multinational Enterprises Substitute Parent Jobs for Foreign
Ones? Evidence from Firm Level Panel Data
Jozef Konings and Alan Murphye Apr. 2001
No. 370 From Needs to the Market: Changing Inequality of Household
Income in the Czech Transition
Jiri Vecernik Apr. 2001
No. 369 Competition and Corporate Governance: Substitutes or
Complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange
Irena Grosfeld and Thierry
Tressel
Mar. 2001
No. 368 Multinational Corporations as Catalyst for Industrial
Development: The Case of Poland
Carlo Altomonte and Laura
Resmini
Feb. 2001
No. 367 A Multi-Task Theory of the State Enterprise Reform Chong-En Bai, David D. Li,
Zhigang Tao, and Yijiang Wang
Mar. 2001
No. 366 Confidence Building in Emerging Stock Markets Enrico C. Perotti, Luc Laeven,
and Pieter van Oijen
Dec. 2000
No. 365 Incentive Contracting versus Ownership Reforms: Evidence
from China￿s Township and Village Enterprises
Chun Chang, Brian McCall, and
Yijang Wang
Nov. 2000
No. 364 Individual Pay and Outside Options: Evidence from the Polish
Labour Force Survey
Fiona Duffy and Patrick Paul
Walsh
Mar. 2001
No. 363 Investment, Credit Rationing and the Soft Budget Constraint:
Evidence from Czech Panel Data (revised Davidson Institute Working
Paper No. 60a)
Lubom￿r L￿zal and Jan Svejnar Feb. 2001
No. 362  A Network Perspective on Inter-Organizational Transfer of
R&D Capabilities: A Study of International Joint Ventures in Chinese
Automobile Industry
Zheng Zhao, Jaideep Anand and
Will Mitchell
Feb. 2001
No. 361 Network Restructuring and Firm Creation in East-Central
Europe:  A Public-Private Venture
Gerald A. McDermott Dec. 2000
No. 360 Responses of Private and Public Schools to Voucher Funding:





No. 359 Labor Market Uncertainty and Private Sector Labor Supply in
Russia
Steven Stillman Sept. 2000
No. 358 Russian Roulette-Expenditure Inequality and Instability in
Russia, 1994-1998
Branko Jovanovic Sept. 2000
No. 357 Dealing with the Bad Loans of the Chinese Banks John P. Bonin and Yiping Huang Jan. 2001
No. 356 Retail Banking in Hungary: A Foreign Affair? John P. Bonin and IstvÆn `bel Dec. 2000
No. 355 Optimal Speed of Transition: Micro Evidence from the Czech
Republic
Stepan Jurajda and Katherine
Terrell
Dec. 2000
No. 354 Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships Jody Overland, Kenneth L.
Simons and Michael Spagat
Nov. 2000
No. 353 Disintegration and Trade Jarko Fidrmuc and Jan Fidrmuc Nov. 2000
No. 352 Social Capital and Entrepreneurial Performance in Russia: A
Panel Study
Bat Batjargal Dec. 2000
No. 351 Entrepreneurial Versatility, Resources and Firm Performance in
Russia: A Panel Study
Bat Batjargal Dec. 2000The entire Working Paper Series is available at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 350 The Dynamics of Entrepreneurial Networks in a Transitional
Economy: The Case of Russia
Bat Batjargal Dec. 2000
No. 349a R&D and Technology Spillovers via FDI: Innovation and
Absorptive Capacity
Yuko Kinoshita Apr. 2001
No. 349 R&D and Technology Spillovers via FDI: Innovation and
Absorptive Capacity
Yuko Kinoshita Nov. 2000
No. 348  Microeconomic aspects of Economic Growth in Eastern
Europe and the Former Soviet Union, 1950-2000
Sergei Guriev and Barry W. Ickes Nov. 2000
No. 347  Effective versus Statutory Taxation: Measuring Effective Tax
Administration in Transition Economies
Mark E. Schaffer and Gerard
Turley
Nov. 2000
No. 346  Objectives and Constraints of Entrepreneurs: Evidence from
Small and Medium Size Enterprises in Russia and Bulgaria
Francesca Pissarides, Miroslav
Singer and Jan Svejnar
Oct. 2000
No. 345  Corruption and Anticorruption in the Czech Republic Lubom￿r L￿zal and Ev￿en
Kočenda
Oct. 2000
No. 344  The Effects of Direct Foreign Investment on Domestic Firms Jozef Konings Oct. 2000
No. 343 On the Identification of Relative Wage Rigidity Dynamics Patrick A. Puhani Oct. 2000
No. 342  The Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment in Transition
Economies
Alan A. Bevan and Saul Estrin Oct. 2000
No. 341  The Global Spread of Stock Exchanges, 1980-1998 Klaus Weber and Gerald F. Davis Nov. 2000
No. 340  The Costs and Benefits of Euro-isation in Central-Eastern
Europe Before or Instead of EMU Membership
D. Mario Nuti Oct. 2000
No. 339  Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia Sergei Guriev, Igor Makarov and
Mathilde Maurel
Sept. 2000
No. 338  Firm Performance and the Political Economy of Corporate
Governance: Survey Evidence for Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia and
Slovenia
Patrick Paul Walsh and Ciara
Whela
July 2000
No. 337  Investment and Instability Nauro F. Campos and Jeffrey B.
Nugent
May 2000
No. 336  The Evolution of the Insurance Sector in Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
Robert B.K. Pye Aug. 2000
No. 335  Institutional Technology and the Chains of Trust: Capital
Markets and Privatization in Russia and the Czech Republic
Bruce Kogut and Andrew Spicer Aug. 2000
No. 334  The Evolution of Market Integration in Russia Daniel Berkowitz and David N.
DeJong
Aug. 2000
No. 333  Efficiency and Market Share in Hungarian Corporate Sector LÆszl￿ Halpern and GÆbor Kőr￿si July 2000
No. 332  Search-Money-and-Barter Models of Financial Stabilization S.I. Boyarchenko and S.Z.
Levendorskii
July 2000
No. 331  Worker Training in a Restructuring Economy: Evidence from
the Russian Transition
Mark C. Berger, John S. Earle
and Klara Z. Sabirianova
Aug. 2000
No. 330  Economic Development in Palanpur 1957-1993: A Sort of
Growth
Peter Lanjouw Aug. 2000
No. 329  Trust, Organizational Controls, Knowledge Acquisition from
the Foreign Parents, and Performance in Vietnamese International Joint
Ventures
Marjorie A. Lyles, Le Dang
Doanh, and Jeffrey Q. Barden
June 2000
No. 328  Comparative Advertising in the Global Marketplace:  The




No. 327  Post Privatization Enterprise Restructuring Morris Bornstein July 2000
No. 326  Who is Afraid of Political Instability? Nauro F. Campos and Jeffrey B.
Nugent
July 2000
No. 325  Business Groups, the Financial Market and Modernization Raja Kali June 2000
No. 324  Restructuring with What Success?  A Case Study of Russian
Firms
Susan Linz July 2000
No. 323  Priorities and Sequencing in Privatization: Theory and
Evidence from the Czech Republic
Nandini Gupta, John C. Ham and
Jan Svejnar
May 2000
No. 322  Liquidity, Volatility, and Equity Trading Costs Across
Countries and Over Time
Ian Domowitz, Jack Glen and
Ananth Madhavan
Mar. 2000The entire Working Paper Series is available at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 321  Equilibrium Wage Arrears: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis of Institutional Lock-In
John S. Earle and Klara Z.
Sabirianova
Oct. 2000
No. 320 Rethinking Marketing Programs for Emerging Markets Niraj Dawar and Amitava
Chattopadhyay
June 2000
No. 319 Public Finance and Low Equilibria in Transition Economies:
the Role of Institutions
Daniel Daianu and Radu
Vranceanu
June 2000
No. 318 Some Econometric Evidence on the Effectiveness of Active
Labour Market Programmes in East Germany
Martin Eichler and Michael
Lechner
June 2000
No. 317 A Model of Russia￿s ￿Virtual Economy￿ R.E Ericson and B.W Ickes May 2000
No. 316 Financial Institutions, Financial Contagion, and Financial
Crises
Haizhou Huang and Chenggang
Xu
Mar. 2000
No. 315 Privatization versus Regulation in Developing Economies: The
Case of West African Banks
Jean Paul Azam, Bruno Biais, and
Magueye Dia
Feb. 2000
No. 314 Is Life More Risky in the Open? Household Risk-Coping and
the Opening of China￿s Labor Markets
John Giles Apr. 2000
No. 313 Networks, Migration and Investment: Insiders and Outsiders in
Tirupur￿s Production Cluster
Abhijit Banerjee and Kaivan
Munshi
Mar. 2000
No. 312 Computational Analysis of the Impact on India of the Uruguay
Round and the Forthcoming WTO Trade Negotiations
Rajesh Chadha, Drusilla K.
Brown, Alan V. Deardorff and
Robert M. Stern
Mar. 2000
No. 311 Subsidized Jobs for Unemployed Workers in Slovakia Jan. C. van Ours May 2000
No. 310 Determinants of Managerial Pay in the Czech Republic Tor Eriksson, Jaromir Gottvald
and Pavel Mrazek
May 2000
No. 309 The Great Human Capital Reallocation: An Empirical Analysis
of Occupational Mobility in Transitional Russia
Klara Z. Sabirianova Oct. 2000
No. 308 Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina
Pistor, and Jean-Francois Richard
Feb. 2000
No. 307 Community Participation, Teacher Effort, and Educational
Outcome: The Case of El Salvador￿s EDUCO Program
Yasuyuki Sawada Nov. 1999
No. 306 Gender Wage Gap and Segregation in Late Transition Stepan Jurajda May 2000
No. 305 The Gender Pay Gap in the Transition from Communism:
Some Empirical Evidence
Andrew Newell and Barry Reilly May 2000
No. 304 Post-Unification Wage Growth  in East Germany Jennifer Hunt Nov. 1998
No. 303 How Does Privatization Affect Workers?  The Case of the
Russian Mass Privatization Program
Elizabeth Brainerd May 2000
No. 302 Liability for Past Environmental Contamination and
Privatization
Dietrich Earnhart Mar. 2000
No. 301 Varieties, Jobs and EU Enlargement Tito Boeri and Joaquim Oliveira
Martins
May 2000
No. 300 Employer Size Effects in Russia Todd Idson Apr. 2000
No. 299 Information Complements, Substitutes, and Strategic Product
Design
Geoffrey G. Parker and Marshall
W. Van Alstyne
Mar. 2000
No. 298 Markets, Human Capital, and Inequality: Evidence from Rural
China
Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt,
Paul Glewwe, and Li Guo
May 2000
No. 297 Corporate Governance in the Asian Financial Crisis Simon Johnson, Peter Boone,
Alasdair Breach, and Eric
Friedman
Nov. 1999
No. 296 Competition and Firm Performance: Lessons from Russia J. David Brown and John S. Earle Mar. 2000
No. 295 Wage Determination in Russia: An Econometric Investigation Peter J. Luke and Mark E.
Schaffer
Mar. 2000
No. 294 Can Banks Promote Enterprise Restructuring?: Evidence From
a Polish Bank￿s Experience
John P. Bonin and Bozena Leven Mar. 2000
No. 293 Why do Governments Sell Privatised Companies Abroad? Bernardo Bortolotti, Marcella
Fantini and Carlo Scarpa
Mar. 2000
No. 292 Going Public in Poland: Case-by-Case Privatizations, Mass
Privatization and Private Sector Initial Public Offerings
Wolfgang Aussenegg Dec. 1999The entire Working Paper Series is available at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu
No. 291a Institutional Technology and the Chains of Trust: Capital
Markets and Privatization in Russia and the Czech Republic
Bruce Kogut and Andrew Spicer Feb. 2001
No. 291 Institutional Technology and the Chains of Trust: Capital
Markets and Privatization in Russia and the Czech Republic
Bruce Kogut and Andrew Spicer Mar. 1999
No. 290 Banking Crises and Bank Rescues: The Effect of Reputation Jenny Corbett and Janet Mitchell Jan. 2000
No. 289 Do Active Labor Market Policies Help Unemployed Workers to
Find and Keep Regular Jobs?
Jan C. van Ours Feb. 2000
No. 288 Consumption Patterns of the New Elite in Zimbabwe Russell Belk Feb. 2000
No. 287 Barter in Transition Economies: Competing Explanations
Confront Ukranian Data
Dalia Marin, Daniel Kaufmann
and Bogdan Gorochowskij
Jan. 2000
No. 286 The Quest for Pension Reform: Poland￿s Security through
Diversity
Marek G￿ra and Michael
Rutkowski
Jan. 2000
No. 285 Disorganization and Financial Collapse Dalia Marin and Monika
Schnitzer
Oct. 1999
No. 284 Coordinating Changes in M-form and U-form Organizations Yingyi Qian, GØrard Roland and
Chenggang Xu
May 1999
No. 283 Why Russian Workers Do Not Move: Attachment of Workers
Through In-Kind Payments
Guido Friebel and Sergei Guriev Oct. 1999
No. 282 Lessons From Fiascos in Russian Corporate Governance Merritt B. Fox and Michael A.
Heller
Oct. 1999
No. 281 Income Distribution and Price Controls: Targeting a Social
Safety Net During Economic Transition
Michael Alexeev and James
Leitzel
Mar. 1999
No. 280: Starting Positions, Reform Speed, and Economic Outcomes in
Transitioning Economies
William Hallagan and Zhang Jun Jan. 2000
No. 279 : The Value of Prominent Directors Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark
Ramseyer
Oct. 1999
No. 278: The System Paradigm JÆnos Kornai Apr. 1998
No. 277: The Developmental Consequences of Foreign Direct
Investment in the Transition from Socialism to Capitalism: The
Performance of Foreign Owned Firms in Hungary
Lawrence Peter King Sept. 1999
No. 276: Stability and Disorder: An Evolutionary Analysis of Russia￿s
Virtual Economy
Clifford Gaddy and Barry W.
Ickes
Nov. 1999
No. 275: Limiting Government Predation Through Anonymous
Banking: A Theory with Evidence from China.
Chong-En Bai, David D. Li,
Yingyi Qian and Yijiang Wang
July 1999
No. 274: Transition with Labour Supply Tito Boeri Dec. 1999
No. 273: Sectoral Restructuring and Labor Mobility: A Comparative
Look at the Czech Republic
Vit Sorm and Katherine Terrell Nov. 1999
No. 272: Published in: Journal of Comparative Economics ￿Returns to
Human Capital Under the Communist Wage Grid and During the
Transition to a Market Economy￿ Vol. 27, pp. 33-60 1999.
Daniel Munich, Jan Svejnar and
Katherine Terrell
Oct. 1999
No. 271: Barter in Russia: Liquidity Shortage Versus Lack of
Restructuring
Sophie Brana and Mathilde
Maurel
June 1999
No. 270: Tests for Efficient Financial Intermediation with Application to
China
Albert Park and Kaja Sehrt Mar. 1999
No. 269a: Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went
Wrong?
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman
and Anna Tarassova
May 2000
No. 269: Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went
Wrong?
Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman
and Anna Tarassova
Sept. 1999
No. 268: Are Russians Really Ready for Capitalism? Susan Linz Sept. 1999
No. 267: Do Stock Markets Promote Economic Growth? Randall K. Filer, Jan Hanousek
and Nauro Campos
Sept. 1999
No. 266: Objectivity, Proximity and Adaptability in Corporate
Governance
Arnoud W.A Boot and Jonathan
R. Macey
Sept. 1999
No. 265: When the Future is not What it Used to Be: Lessons from the
Western European Experience to Forecasting Education and Training in
Transitional Economies
Nauro F. Campos, Gerard
Hughes, Stepan Jurajda, and
Daniel Munich
Sept. 1999